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UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND AND  HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
Trade  Policy  and  Economic  Growth: 
A  Skeptic's  Guide  to  the 
Cross-National  Evidence 
It isn't what we don't know that kills us. It's what we know that ain't so. 
Mark Twain 
1. Introduction 
Do countries  with  lower barriers to international  trade experience  faster 
economic  progress?  Few  questions  have been  more vigorously  debated 
in the history  of economic  thought,  and none  is more central to the vast 
literature on trade and development. 
The prevailing  view  in policy  circles in North America  and Europe is 
that recent economic  history provides  a conclusive  answer in the affirma- 
tive.  Multilateral institutions  such  as the World Bank, the IMF, and the 
OECD regularly promulgate advice predicated on the belief that openness 
generates  predictable  and  positive  consequences  for growth.  A recent 
report  by  the  OECD  (1998,  p.  36)  states:  "More open  and  outward- 
oriented  economies  consistently  outperform  countries  with  restrictive 
trade and [foreign] investment  regimes."  According  to the IMF (1997, p. 
We thank Dan Ben-David,  Sebastian Edwards, Jeffrey Frankel, David Romer, Jeffrey Sachs, 
and Andrew  Warner for generously  sharing their data with us. We are particularly grateful 
to  Ben-David,  Frankel,  Romer,  Sachs,  Warner, and  Romain  Wacziarg for helpful  email 
exchanges.  We have  benefited  greatly  from  discussions  in seminars  at the  University  of 
California at Berkeley, University  of Maryland,  University  of Miami, University  of Michi- 
gan,  MIT, the  Inter-American  Development  Bank,  Princeton,  Yale, IMF, IESA, and  the 
NBER. We also  thank  Ben Bernanke,  Roger  Betancourt,  Allan  Drazen,  Gene  Grossman, 
Ann Harrison, Chang-Tai Hsieh,  Doug Irwin, Chad Jones, Frank Levy, Douglas  Irwin, Rick 
Mishkin,  Arvind  Panagariya, Ken Rogoff, James Tybout, and Eduardo Zambrano for help- 
ful comments,  Vladimir  Kliouev  for excellent  research  assistance,  and  the  Weatherhead 
Center for International  Affairs at Harvard for partial financial support. 262 *  RODRfGUEZ  & RODRIK 
84): "Policies toward foreign trade are among the more important factors 
promoting  economic  growth  and convergence  in developing  countries." 
This view  is widespread  in the economics  profession  as well.  Krueger 
(1998, p.  1513), for example,  judges  that it is straightforward  to demon- 
strate  empirically  the  superior  growth  performance  of  countries  with 
"outer-oriented"  trade  strategies.  According  to  Stiglitz  (1998,  p.  36), 
"[m]ost  specifications  of  empirical  growth  regressions  find  that  some 
indicator of external openness-whether  trade ratios or indices  or price 
distortions  or average tariff level-is  strongly  associated  with per-capita 
income  growth."  According  to  Fischer  (2000),  "[i]ntegration  into  the 
world  economy  is the best way  for countries  to grow." 
Such  statements  notwithstanding,  if there  is  an inverse  relationship 
between  trade barriers and economic  growth,  it is not one that immedi- 
ately  stands  out  in the  data.  See  for example  Figure  1. The figure  dis- 
plays  the  (partial) associations  over  1975-1994  between  the growth  rate 
of  per  capita  GDP  and  two  measures  of  trade  restrictions.  The  first 
measure  is  an  average  tariff rate,  calculated  by  dividing  total  import 
duties  by  the  volume  of  imports.  The  second  is  a  coverage  ratio  for 
nontariff barriers to trade.1 The figures  show  the  relationship  between 
these  measures  and growth  after controlling  for levels  of initial income 
and secondary  education.  In both  cases,  the slope  of the relationship  is 
only  slightly  negative  and  nowhere  near  statistical  significance.  This 
finding  is  not  atypical.  Simple  measures  of  trade barriers  tend  not  to 
enter  significantly  in  well-specified  growth  regressions,  regardless  of 
time periods,  subsamples,  or the conditioning  variables employed. 
Of course,  neither  of the two measures  used  above is a perfect indica- 
tor of trade  restrictions.  Simple  tariff averages  underweight  high  tariff 
rates because  the corresponding  import levels  tend to be low. Such aver- 
ages  are also poor  proxies  for overall  trade restrictions when  tariff and 
nontariff  barriers are substitutes.  As  for the  nontariff  coverage  ratios, 
they  do  not  do  a good  job of discriminating  between  barriers that  are 
highly  restrictive  and  barriers with  little  effect.  And  conceptual  flaws 
aside,  both  indicators  are  clearly  measured  with  some  error  (due  to 
smuggling,  weaknesses  in the underlying  data, coding  problems,  etc.). 
In part because  of concerns related to data quality, the recent literature 
on openness  and growth  has resorted to more creative empirical strate- 
gies.  These  strategies  include:  (1) constructing  alternative  indicators  of 
openness  (Dollar, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1995); (2) testing robustness  by 
using a wide  range of measures  of openness,  including  subjective indica- 
1. Data for the first measure  come from World Bank (1998). The second  is taken from Barro 
and Lee (1994), and is based  on UNCTAD compilations. Trade  Policy and Economic  Growth *  263 
Figure 1 PARTIAL  ASSOCIATION BETWEEN GROWTH AND  DIRECT 
MEASURES OF TRADE RESTRICTIONS 
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tors  (Edwards,  1992, 1998); and  (3) comparing  convergence  experience 
among  groups  of liberalizing  and nonliberalizing  countries  (Ben-David, 
1993). This recent round  of empirical research is generally  credited with 
having  yielded  stronger  and  more  convincing  results  on  the beneficial 
consequences  of openness  than  the previous,  largely  case-based  litera- 
ture. Indeed,  the cumulative  evidence  that has emerged  from such stud- 
ies  provides  the  foundation  for the previously  noted  consensus  on the 
growth-promoting  effects of trade openness.  The frequency  with  which 
these studies  are cited in international  economics  textbooks and in policy 
discussions  is one indicator of the influence  that they have  exerted. 
Our goal in this paper is to scrutinize  this new  generation  of research. 
We do  so by  focusing  on what  the  existing  literature has  to say  on the 
following  question:  Do countries  with lower  policy-induced  barriers  to interna- 
tional trade  growfaster, once other  relevant  country characteristics  are controlled 
for? We take this  to be  the  central  question  of  policy  relevance  in this 
area. To the extent  that the empirical  literature demonstrates  a positive 
causal link from openness  to growth,  the main operational implication  is 
that governments  should  dismantle  their barriers to trade. Therefore,  it 
is critical to ask how  well  the  evidence  supports  the presumption  that 
doing  so would  raise growth  rates. 
Note  that this question  differs from an alternative  one  we  could have 
asked: Does international  trade  raise  growth rates of income?  This is a related, 
but conceptually  distinct question.  Trade policies  do affect the volume  of 
trade,  of course.  But there  is no  strong  reason  to expect  their effect  on 
growth  to be  quantitatively  (or even  qualitatively)  similar to the  conse- 
quences  of changes  in trade volumes  that arise from,  say, reductions  in 
transport  costs  or increases  in world  demand.  To the  extent  that trade 
restrictions represent policy responses  to real or perceived  market imper- 
fections  or, at the  other  extreme,  are mechanisms  for rent  extraction, 
they will work differently  from natural or geographical  barriers to trade 
and other exogenous  determinants.  Frankel and Romer (1999) recognize 
this  point  in their recent  paper  on  the  relationship  between  trade vol- 
umes  and income  levels.  These authors use the geographical  component 
of  trade  volumes  as  an  instrument  to  identify  the  effects  of  trade  on 
income  levels.  They  appropriately  caution  that their results  cannot  be 
directly applied  to the effects of trade policies. 
From an operational  standpoint,  it is clear that the relevant question  is 
the one having  to do with  the consequences  of trade policies rather than 
trade  volumes. Hence  we  focus  on  the  recent  empirical  literature  that 
attempts  to measure  the effect of trade policies.  Our main finding  is that 
this literature is largely uninformative  regarding  the question  we  posed 
above.  There is a significant  gap between  the message  that the consum- Trade  Policy  and  Economic  Growth  ?  265 
ers  of  this  literature  have  derived  and  the  facts  that the  literature has 
actually  demonstrated.  The gap  emerges  from  a number  of factors.  In 
many cases,  the indicators of openness  used by researchers are problem- 
atic as  measures  of  trade  barriers or are highly  correlated  with  other 
sources  of  poor  economic  performance.  In  other  cases,  the  empirical 
strategies  used  to  ascertain  the  link between  trade policy  and  growth 
have  serious  shortcomings,  the removal  of which  results in significantly 
weaker  findings. 
The  literature  on  openness  and  growth  through  the  late  1980s was 
usefully  surveyed  in  a paper  by  Edwards  (1993). This  survey  covered 
detailed  multicountry  analyses  (such as Little, Scitovsky, and Scott, 1970, 
and Balassa,  1971) as well  as cross-country  econometric  studies  (such as 
Feder,  1983,  Balassa,  1985,  and  Esfahani,  1991).  Most  of  the  cross- 
national econometric  research that was available up to that point focused 
on the relationship  between  exports and growth,  and not on trade policy 
and growth.  Edwards's  evaluation  of this literature was largely negative 
(1993, p.  1389): 
[M]uch of the cross-country  regression-based  studies have been plagued by 
empirical and conceptual shortcomings. The theoretical frameworks used 
have been increasingly  simplistic,  failing to address  important  questions such 
as the exact  mechanism  through  which export  expansion affects  GDP  growth, 
and ignoring potential determinants of growth such as educational attain- 
ment. Also, many papers have been characterized  by a lack of care  in dealing 
with issues related to endogeneity and measurement errors. All of this has 
resulted, in many cases, in unconvincing results whose fragility has been 
exposed by subsequent work. 
Edwards  argued that such weaknesses  had reduced  the policy impact of 
the cross-national  econometric  research covered  in his review. 
Our paper  picks  up  where  Edwards's  survey  left off.  We focus  on  a 
number  of  empirical  papers  that  either  were  not  included  in  or have 
appeared since that survey. Judging by the number of citations in publica- 
tions  by  governmental  and  multilateral  institutions  and  in  textbooks, 
this recent round of empirical research has been considerably  more influ- 
ential  in policy  and  academic  circles.2 Our detailed  analysis  covers  the 
2. We gave examples of citations from international  institutions above. Here are some 
examples from recent textbooks.  Yarbrough  and Yarbrough  (2000,  p. 19)  write "[o]n  the 
trade-growth  connection, the empirical  evidence is clear that countries  with open mar- 
kets experience  faster  growth,"  citing Edwards  (1998).  Caves, Frankel,  and Jones (1999, 
pp. 256-257) warn that "[r]esearch  testing this proposition  is not unanimous"  but then 
continue  to say "productivity  growth  does seem to increase  with openness to the interna- 
tional economy and freedom  from price and allocative  distortions  in the domestic  econ- 266 - RODRIGUEZ  & RODRIK 
four papers  that are probably the best known  in the field: Dollar (1992), 
Sachs  and  Warner (1995),  Ben-David  (1993),  and  Edwards  (1998).  We 
also include  an analysis  of Frankel and Romer (1999), and shorter discus- 
sions  of Lee (1993), Harrison  (1996), and Wacziarg (1998). 
A few words  about the selection  of papers.  The paper by Dollar (1992) 
was  not  reviewed  in  Edwards's  survey,  perhaps  because  it  had  only 
recently been  published.  We include  it here because  it is, by our count, 
the most heavily  cited empirical paper on the link between  openness  and 
growth.  Sachs  and  Warner (1995) is  a close  second,  and  the  index  of 
openness  constructed  therein  has  now  been  widely  used  in the  cross- 
national research on growth.3 The other two papers are also well known, 
but in these  cases our decision  was based  less on citation counts  than on 
the fact that they are representative  of different  types  of methodologies. 
Ben-David  (1993) considers  income  convergence  in countries  that have 
integrated  with  each  other  (such  as  the  European  Community  coun- 
tries).  Edwards  (1998) undertakes  a robustness  analysis  using  a wide 
range  of  trade-policy  indicators,  including  some  subjective  indicators. 
Some  of the other recent studies  on the relationship  between  trade pol- 
icy and growth will be discussed  in the penultimate  section of the paper. 
Our bottom  line  is that the  nature  of the  relationship  between  trade 
policy  and economic  growth  remains  very much  an open  question.  The 
issue is far from having been settled on empirical grounds.  We are in fact 
skeptical  that  there  is  a  general,  unambiguous  relationship  between 
trade openness  and  growth  waiting  to be  discovered.  We suspect  that 
the relationship  is a contingent  one,  dependent  on a host of country and 
external  characteristics.  Research  aimed  at  ascertaining  the  circum- 
stances  under  which  open  trade  policies  are conducive  to  growth  (as 
well  as  those  under  which  they  may  not  be)  and  at  scrutinizing  the 
channels  through  which  trade policies  influence  economic  performance 
is likely to prove more productive. 
omy,"  citing Sachs and Warer (1995)  and Dollar (1992).  Husted and Melvin (1997)  cite 
Ben-David  (1993)  in support  of the FPE  theorem  (p. 111),  and Sachs  and Warner  (1995)  in 
support of the statement that "[o]nly a few countries  have followed outward-oriented 
development strategies  for extensive periods of time, but those that have done so have 
been very successful"  (p. 287). Krugman  and Obstfeld (1997,  260)  write that by the late 
1980s  "[s]tatistical  evidence appeared  to suggest that  developing countries  that followed 
relatively free trade policies had on average grown more rapidly than those that fol- 
lowed protectionist  policies (although this statistical  evidence has been challenged by 
some economists)." 
3. From  its date of publication,  Dollar's  paper  has been cited at least 92 times, according  to 
the Social  Science  Citations  Index.  Sachs and Warner  (1995) is a close second, with 81 
citations. Edwards (1992),  Ben-David  (1993),  and Lee (1993)  round off the list, with 57, 
38, and 17 citations,  respectively. Trade  Policy  and  Economic  Growth  *  267 
Finally, it is worthwhile  reminding  the reader that growth  and welfare 
are not  the same  thing.  Trade policies  can have  positive  effects  on wel- 
fare without  affecting  the rate of economic  growth.  Conversely,  even  if 
policies  that restrict international  trade were to reduce economic  growth, 
it does not follow that they would  necessarily  reduce the level of welfare. 
Negative  coefficients  on policy  variables in growth  regressions  are com- 
monly  interpreted  as indicating  that the policies  in question  are norma- 
tively  undesirable.  Strictly speaking,  such  inferences  are invalid.4  Our 
paper  centers  on  the relationship  between  trade policy  and  growth  be- 
cause this is the issue  that has received  the most attention in the existing 
literature. We caution the reader that the welfare  implications  of empiri- 
cal  results  regarding  this  link  (be  they  positive  or negative)  must  be 
treated with  caution. 
The  outline  of  this  paper  is as  follows.  We begin  with  a conceptual 
overview  of the issues  relating to openness  and growth.  We then turn to 
an  in-depth  examination  of  each  of  the  four  papers  mentioned  previ- 
ously  (Dollar,  1992; Sachs  and  Warner, 1995; Edwards,  1998; and  Ben- 
David  1993), followed  by  a section  on  Frankel and  Romer  (1999). The 
penultimate  section discusses  briefly three other papers (Lee, 1993; Harri- 
son,  1996; and  Wacziarg  1998).  We  offer  some  final  thoughts  in  the 
concluding  section. 
2.  Conceptual  Issues 
Think of a small  economy  that takes  world  prices  of tradable goods  as 
given.  What is the relationship  between  trade restrictions  and real GDP 
in such  an economy?  The moder  theory  of trade policy  as it applies  to 
such  a country  can be summarized  in the following  three propositions: 
1.  In static models  with  no market imperfections  and other pre-existing 
distortions,  the effect of a trade restriction is to reduce the level of real 
GDP at world prices.  In the presence  of market failures such as exter- 
nalities,  trade restrictions  may increase  real GDP (although  they  are 
hardly ever the first-best means  of doing  so). 
2.  In standard models  with exogenous  technological  change and dimin- 
ishing  returns  to  reproducible  factors  of production  (e.g.,  the  neo- 
4. Some of the main problems  with economic growth as a measure of welfare are that: (1) 
the empirically  identifiable  effect of policies on rates of growth-especially  over short 
intervals-could  be different  from their  effect  on levels of income;  (2) levels of per capita 
income may not be good indicators  of welfare  because they do not capture  the distribu- 
tion of income or the level of access to primary  goods and basic capabilities;  and (3)  high 
growth rates could be associated  with suboptimally  low levels of present consumption. 268 *  RODRfGUEZ  & RODRIK 
classical model of growth),  a trade restriction has no effect on the long- 
run (steady-state)  rate of growth  of output.5 This is true regardless  of 
the existence  of market imperfections.  However,  there may be growth 
effects  during  the  transition  to  the  steady  state.  (These  transitional 
effects may be positive  or negative,  depending  on how  the long-run 
level  of output  is affected by the trade restriction.) 
3.  In models  of endogenous  growth  generated  by  nondiminishing  re- 
turns  to reproducible  factors of production  or by  learning-by-doing 
and other forms  of endogenous  technological  change,  the presump- 
tion is that lower  trade restrictions boost  output  growth  in the world 
economy  as a whole.  But a subset  of countries may experience  dimin- 
ished  growth,  depending  on their initial factor endowments  and lev- 
els of technological  development. 
Taken together,  these points  imply that there should  be no theoretical 
presumption  in favor of finding  an unambiguous,  negative  relationship 
between  trade barriers and  growth  rates in the  types  of cross-national 
data sets typically  analyzed.6 The main complications  are twofold.  First, 
in the  presence  of certain  market  failures,  such  as positive  production 
externalities  in  import-competing  sectors,  the  long-run  levels  of  GDP 
(measured  at world  prices)  can be  higher  with  trade  restrictions  than 
without.  In such cases,  data sets covering relatively short time spans will 
reveal  a positive  (partial) association  between  trade restrictions  and the 
growth  of output  along the path of convergence  to the new  steady  state. 
Second,  under conditions  of endogenous  growth,  trade restrictions may 
also  be  associated  with  higher  growth  rates  of  output  whenever  the 
restrictions  promote  technologically  more  dynamic  sectors  over  others. 
In dynamic  models,  moreover,  an increase in the growth  rate of output 
is neither  a necessary  nor a sufficient  condition  for an improvement  in 
welfare. 
Since endogenous-growth  models  are often thought  to have provided 
the  missing  theoretical  link  between  trade  openness  and  long-run 
growth,  it is  useful  to  spend  a moment  on  why  such  models  in  fact 
provide  an ambiguous  answer.  As emphasized  by Grossman  and Help- 
man  (1991),  the  general  answer  to  the  question  "Does  trade  promote 
5. Strictly speaking,  this statement  is true only when  the marginal product of the reproduc- 
ible  factors  ("capital") tends  to  zero  in  the  limit.  If this  marginal  product  is bounded 
below  by a sufficiently  large positive  constant,  trade policies  can have an effect on long- 
run growth  rates,  similar to their effect in the more recent endogenous  growth  models 
(point 3 below).  See the discussion  in Srinivasan  (1997). 
6. See Buffie (1998) for an extensive  theoretical  discussion  of the issues  from the perspec- 
tive of developing  countries. Trade  Policy  and  Economic  Growth  *  269 
innovation  in a small open economy?"  is "It depends."7  In particular, the 
answer  depends  on whether  the forces  of comparative  advantage  push 
the economy's  resources  in the direction  of activities  that generate  long- 
run growth  (via externalities  in research  and  development,  expanding 
product  variety,  upgrading  product  quality,  and  so  on)  or divert  them 
from  such  activities.  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1991),  Feenstra  (1990), 
Matsuyama  (1992), and others have worked  out examples  where  a coun- 
try that is behind in technological  development  can be driven by trade to 
specialize  in traditional goods  and experience  a reduction  in its long-run 
rate of growth.  Such models  are in fact formalizations  of some  very old 
arguments  about  infant  industries  and  about  the  need  for  temporary 
protection  to catch up with  more advanced  countries. 
The issues  can be clarified with  the help  of a simple  model  of a small 
open economy  with learning-by-doing.  The model is a simplified  version 
of that in Matsuyama  (1992), except that we  analyze  the growth  implica- 
tions  of  varying  the  import  tariff,  rather than  simply  comparing  free 
trade with  autarky. The economy  is assumed  to have  two  sectors,  agri- 
culture (a) and manufacturing  (m), with the latter subject to learning-by- 
doing  that  is  external  to  individual  firms  in  the  sector  but  internal  to 
manufacturing  as a whole.  Let labor be the only  mobile  factor between 
the  two  sectors,  and  normalize  the  economy's  labor  endowment  to 
unity. We can then write the production  functions  of the manufacturing 
and agricultural sectors,  respectively,  as 
X:  =  Mtnt, 
Xt  =  A(1  -  nt), 
where  nt stands  for the  labor force in manufacturing,  a is the  share  of 
labor  in  value  added  in  the  two  sectors  (assumed  to  be  identical  for 
simplicity),  and  t  is  a  time  subscript.  The  productivity  coefficient  in 
manufacturing,  Mt, is a state variable evolving  according to 
t =  8X, 
where  an  overdot  represents  a  time  derivative  and  8  captures  the 
strength  of the learning  effect. 
We assume  the  economy  has  an initial  comparative  disadvantage  in 
manufacturing,  and  normalize  the  relative  price  of  manufactures  on 
world  markets to unity. If the ad valorem  import tariff on manufactures 
is T, the  domestic  relative  price of manufactured  goods  becomes  1 +  7. 
7. This is a slight paraphrase  of Grossman  and Helpman (1991,  p. 152). 270 *  RODRIGUEZ  & RODRIK 
Instantaneous  equilibrium  in the  labor market requires  the  equality  of 
value marginal products  of labor in the two sectors: 
A(1  -  nt)a"-  =  (1  +  r)Mtnt-1 
It can be  checked  that an increase  in the  import  tariff has  the  effect  of 
allocating  more of the economy's  labor to the manufacturing  sector: 
dn, 
>  0. 
dr 
Further, for a constant  level  of r, nt evolves  according  to 
fit =  (1 -  nt)nt,  1-ac 
where  ^  denotes  proportional  changes. 
Let Yt denote  the value  of output  in the economy  evaluated  at world 
prices: 
Yt = M,n  + A(1 -  nt)a. 
Then the instantaneous  rate of growth  of output  at world  prices can be 
expressed  as follows: 
Yt =  8 ( At +-  (At-  n)  nt  1-a-o 
where  At  is the share of manufacturing  output  in total output  when  both 
are expressed  at world  prices (i.e.,  At = Xt/Yt). 
Consider  first the case when  r = 0. In this case,  it can be checked  that 
At  nt and  the  expression  for the  instantaneous  growth  rate of output 
simplifies  to Yt =  Atna, which is strictly positive  whenever  nt > O.  Growth 
arises  from the  dynamic  effects  of learning,  and is faster the larger the 
manufacturing  base  nt. A  small  tariff would  have  a positive  effect  on 
growth  on account of this channel because  it would  enlarge the manufac- 
turing sector (raise nt). 
When  r >  0, the manufacturing  share of output  at world  prices is less 
than the labor share in manufacturing,  and At  < nt. Now  the second  term 
in the expression  for Yt  is negative.  The intuition  is as follows.  The tariff 
imposes  a production-side  distortion  in the  allocation  of the economy's 
resources.  For any given gap between  At  and nt, the productive  efficiency 
cost  of  this  distortion  rises  as  manufacturing  output  (the  base  of  the 
distortion)  gets  larger. Trade  Policy and Economic  Growth ?  271 
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Hence  the tariff exerts two contradictory effects on growth.  By pulling 
resources  into  the  manufacturing  sector,  it enlarges  the  scope  for dy- 
namic  scale  benefits,  thereby  increasing  growth.  But it also  imposes  a 
static efficiency loss,  the cost of which  rises over time as the manufactur- 
ing sector becomes  larger.8 Figure 2 shows  the relationship  between  the 
tariff and  the  rate of growth  of output  (at world  prices) for a particular 
parameterization  of this model.  Two curves  are shown,  one  for the  in- 
stantaneous  rate  of  growth  (based  on  the  expression  above),  and  the 
other for the average growth  rate over a twenty-year  horizon  [calculated 
as  1 (In Y20  -  In YO)].  In both  cases,  growth  increases  in T  until a critical 
level,  and then  diminishes  in  r. This pattern is,  however,  by no means 
8. We emphasize  once  again  that these  results  on  the  growth  of output do  not  translate 
directly  into  welfare  consequences.  In this  particular model,  the  level effect  of a tariff 
distortion  also has to be taken into account before a judgment  on welfare can be passed. 
Hence  it is possible  for welfare  to be reduced  (raised) even  though  the  growth  rate of 
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general,  and  other  types  of  results  can  be  obtained  under  different 
parameterizations. 
The model clarifies a number of issues.  First, it shows  that it is relatively 
straightforward  to write a well-specified  model that generates the conclu- 
sions  that many  opponents  of trade openness  have  espoused-namely, 
that free trade can be detrimental  to some countries' economic  prospects, 
especially when  these countries are lagging in technological  development 
and  have  an  initial  comparative  advantage  in  "nondynamic"  sectors. 
More broadly, the model  illustrates that there is no determinate  theoreti- 
cal link between  trade protection and growth once real-world phenomena 
such  as learning,  technological  change,  and market imperfections  (here 
captured  by  a  learning-by-doing  externality)  are  taken  into  account. 
Third,  it highlights  the  exact  sense  in  which  trade  restrictions  distort 
market outcomes.  A trade barrier has resource-allocation  effects because 
it  alters  a  domestic price  ratio: it  raises  the  domestic  price  of  import- 
competing  activities  relative  to  the  domestic  price  of exportables,  and 
hence  introduces  a wedge  between  the domestic  relative-price ratio and 
the opportunity  costs reflected in relative border prices.9 While this point 
is obvious,  it bears  repeating,  as some  of the  empirical  work  reviewed 
below  interprets openness  in a very different manner. 
3.  David Dollar (1992) 
As mentioned  previously,  the paper by Dollar (1992) is one  of the most 
heavily  cited studies  on the relationship  between  openness  and growth. 
The principal contribution of Dollar's paper lies in the construction of two 
separate  indices,  which  Dollar demonstrates  are each negatively  corre- 
lated with growth over the 1976-1985 period in a sample of 95 developing 
countries.  The two indices  are an "index of real exchange-rate distortion" 
and  an  "index  of  real  exchange-rate  variability"  (henceforth  DISTOR- 
TION and VARIABILITY).  These indices  relate to "outward orientation," 
as understood  by Dollar (1992, p. 524), in the following  way: 
Outward orientation  generally means a combination  of two factors:  first, the 
level  of protection, especially for inputs into the  production process, is 
9. Some authors  have stressed the effects that the high levels of discretion  associated  with 
trade policies can have on rent seeking and thus on economic performance  (Krueger, 
1974;  Bhagwati,  1982).  These effects go beyond the direct  impact  on resource  allocation 
that we discuss. They are however related more directly to the discretionary  nature of 
policies than to their effect on the economy's openness. Discretionary  export  promotion 
policies-which  will make an economy more open-should  in principle be just as 
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relatively  low (resulting  in a sustainable  level of the real exchange rate that is 
favorable  to exporters);  and second, there is relatively  little variability  in the 
real exchange rate, so that incentives are consistent over time. 
We  shall  argue  that  DISTORTION has  serious  conceptual  flaws  as  a 
measure  of trade restrictions,  and is in any case not a robust correlate of 
growth,  while  VARIABILITY,  which  appears  to be robust,  is a measure 
of instability  more than anything  else. 
In order to implement  his  approach,  Dollar uses  data from Summers 
and  Heston  (1988,  Mark 4.0)  on  comparative  price  levels.  Their work 
compares  prices  of  an  identical  basket  of  consumption  goods  across 
countries.  Hence,  letting  the  United  States be  the  benchmark  country, 
these  data provide  estimates  of each country i's price level (RPLi)  relative 
to the  United  States: RPLi =  100 x  Pi/(eiPus), where  Pi and Pus are the 
respective  consumption  price  indices,  and  ei is  the  nominal  exchange 
rate of country  i against  the U.S.  dollar (in units  of home  currency per 
dollar).10 Since Dollar is interested  in the prices  of tradable goods  only, 
he attempts  to purge the effect of systematic  differences  arising from the 
presence  of nontradables.  To do this,  he regresses  RPLi  on the level and 
square  of GDP per  capita and  on  regional  dummies  for Latin America 
and Africa, as well  as year dummies.  Let the predicted  value  from this 
regression  be denoted  RPLi. Dollar's  index  DISTORTION is RPLi/RPLi, 
averaged  over  the  ten-year  period  1976-1985.  VARIABILITY  is in turn 
calculated  by  taking  the  coefficient  of variation  of the  annual  observa- 
tions of RPLi/RPLi for each country  over the same period. 
Dollar  interprets  the  variation  in  the  values  of DISTORTION across 
countries  as capturing  cross-national  differences  in the restrictiveness  of 
trade policy.  He  states:  "the index  derived  here measures  the extent  to 
which  the real exchange rate is distorted away from its free-trade level by 
the trade regime" and "a country sustaining  a high price level over many 
years would  clearly have  to be a country with  a relatively  large amount 
of protection" (Dollar 1992, p. 524). Since this type of claim is often made 
in other work as well,1  we shall spend  some  time on it before reviewing 
Dollar's empirical results.  We will show  that a comparison  of price indi- 
ces  for  tradables  is  informative  about  levels  of  trade  protection  only 
under very restrictive conditions  that are unlikely  to hold in practice. 
10. Our notation  differs  from  Dollar's  (1992). In particular, the  exchange  rate is  defined 
differently. 
11. For example,  in Bhalla and Lau (1992), whose  index is also used  in Harrison (1996). We 
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3.1 TRADE  POLICIES  AND PRICE  LEVELS 
We will not discuss  further Dollar's method  for purging  the component 
of nontradable-goods  prices that is systematically  related to income  and 
other characteristics.12 Assuming  the method  is successful,  the DISTOR- 
TION measure  approximates  (up to a random  error term) the price of a 
country's  tradables relative to the United States.  Letting pT  stand for the 
price  index  for  tradables  and  neglecting  the  error,  the  DISTORTION 
index  for country i can then be expressed  as PiT/(eiPs). 
Let us,  without  loss of generality, fix the price level  of tradables in the 
United  States,  PUs,  and assume  that free trade prevails  there.  The ques- 
tion  is under  what  conditions  trade restrictions  will be associated  with 
higher levels  of PT/(iPus). Obviously,  the answer depends  on the effect of 
the restrictions  on Pf(and  possibly  on ei). 
Note  that  PiTis an  aggregate  price  index  derived  from  the  domestic 
prices  of  two  types  of  tradables:  import-competing  goods  and  export- 
ables.  Hence  PT  can be expressed  as a linearly  homogenous  function  of 
the form 
pT =  T(pi,  p  , 
where  pm  and px  are the domestic  prices of import-competing  goods  and 
exportables,  respectively.  Since  Summers-Heston  price  levels  are esti- 
mated  for  an  identical  basket  of  goods,  the  price-index  function  T(') 
applies  equally  to the United States: 
PUs =  r(PS,  pus).) 
Next,  define  tm  and  tx  as the  ad valorem  equivalent  of import  restric- 
tions  and  export  restrictions,  respectively.  Assume  that the  law  of one 
price holds  (we shall relax this below).  Then,  pi  =  e/pus(l +  t7) and pi = 
eipxus/l  +  ti.  Consequently,  the  domestic  price  of  tradables  relative  to 
U.S.  prices can be expressed  as 
iP(1( +  t);),ps/+  pS%  (1 +  )(1 + tm) 
eP]s  7TP(M(1 +p;s)  ( 
1 
Ps/+  Ps)) 
efipus  ^  PXus)  W  Sr(p,  s) 
12. For a good  recent discussion  of the problems  that may arise on this account see  Falvey 
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where  we  have  made  use  of the  linear homogeneity  of  7r(-). Note  that 
the nominal  exchange  rate has dropped  out thanks to the assumption  of 
the law of one price. 
Consider  first the case where  there are binding  import restrictions, but 
no export restrictions (t' > 0 and t = 0). In this instance,  it is apparent that 
PT  >  eiP1ts, and  trade restrictions  do  indeed  raise  the  domestic  price  of 
tradables  (relative  to the benchmark  country).  Judging  from the quota- 
tions above,  this is the case that Dollar seems  to have in mind. 
On the other hand,  consider  what happens  when  the country in ques- 
tion  rescinds  all import  restrictions  and  imposes  instead  export  restric- 
tions at an ad valorem level that equals that of the import restrictions just 
lifted (t7 = 0 and t  >  0). From the Lerner (1936) symmetry  theorem,  it is 
evident  that the switch  from import protection  to export taxation has no 
resource-allocation  and  distributional  effects  for the  economy  whatso- 
ever.  The relative price between  tradables,  pim/p remains  unaffected  by 
the switch.  Yet, because  export restrictions  reduce the domestic  price of 
exportables  relative to world prices, it is now  the case that PT< eiPts. The 
country  will now  appear, by Dollar's measure,  to be outward-oriented. 
One practical implication  is that economies  that combine  import barri- 
ers with export taxes (such as many countries  in sub-Saharan Africa) will 
be  judged  less  protected  than  those  that  rely  on  import  restrictions 
alone.  Conversely,  countries  that dilute  the  protective  effect  of import 
restrictions by using  export subsidies  (tx  <  0) will appear more protected 
than countries  that do not do so. 
Hence  the DISTORTION index is sensitive  to the form in which  trade 
restrictions are applied.  This follows  from the fact that trade policies work 
by altering relative price within an economy;  they do not have unambigu- 
ous implications  for the level of prices in a country relative to another. A 
necessary  condition  for Dollar's index  to do a good job of ranking trade 
regimes  according  to restrictiveness  is that export policies  (whether  they 
tax or promote exports) play a comparatively  minor role. Moreover, as we 
show  in the next section,  this is not a sufficient  condition. 
3.2 HOW RELEVANT  IS THE  LAW  OF ONE PRICE  IN PRACTICE? 
The discussion  above  was  framed  in terms  that are the most  favorable 
to  Dollar's  measure,  in  that  we  assumed  the  law  of  one  price  (LOP) 
holds.  Under  this  maintained  hypothesis,  the  prices  of tradable goods 
produced  in different  countries  can diverge  from each  other,  when  ex- 
pressed  in a common  currency, only  when  there exist trade restrictions 
(or transport costs). 
However,  there is a vast  array of evidence  suggesting  that LOP does 
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Rogoff (1996, p.  648) writes  of the "startling empirical failure of the law 
of  one  price."  Rogoff  concludes:  "commodities  where  the  deviations 
from the law of one price damp out very quickly are the exception  rather 
than the rule" (Rogoff, 1996, p. 650). Further, the evidence  suggests  that 
deviations  from LOP are systematically  related  to movements  in nomi- 
nal  exchange  rates  (see  references  in  Rogoff,  1996).  Indeed,  it is  well 
known  that (nominal)  exchange-rate  policies  in many  developing  coun- 
tries  are responsible  for producing  large  and  sustained  swings  in  real 
exchange  rates.  Trade barriers or transport costs  typically  play  a much 
smaller role. 
Dollar  (1992,  p.  525) acknowledges  that  "there might  be  short-term 
fluctuations  [unrelated  to trade barriers] if purchasing-power  parity did 
not hold continuously,"  but considers  that these  fluctuations would  aver- 
age out over time.  Rogoff (1996, p. 647) concludes  in his survey  that the 
speed  of  convergence  to  purchasing-power  parity  (PPP) is  extremely 
slow, of the order of roughly  15% per year. At this speed  of convergence, 
averages  constructed  over a time horizon  of 10 years (the horizon used  in 
Dollar's  paper)  would  exhibit  substantial  divergence  from  PPP in  the 
presence  of nominal  shocks. 
Under  this  interpretation,  a significant  portion  of  the  cross-national 
variation  in price levels  exhibited  in DISTORTION would  be due  not to 
trade policies,  but to monetary  and exchange-rate  policies.  Unlike  trade 
policies,  nominal  exchange-rate  movements  have an unambiguous  effect 
on the domestic price level of traded goods relative to foreign prices when 
LOP fails: an appreciation  raises the price of both import-competing  and 
exportable  goods  relative  to foreign  prices,  and  a depreciation  has  the 
reverse  effect.  Countries  where  the nominal  exchange  rate was  not  al- 
lowed  to depreciate in line with domestic inflation would  exhibit an appre- 
ciation  of  the  real  exchange  rate  (a rise  in  domestic  prices  relative  to 
foreign levels),  and correspondingly  would  be rated high on the DISTOR- 
TION index.  Countries  with  aggressive  policies  of devaluation  (or low 
inflation relative to the trend depreciation  of their nominal exchange  rate) 
would  receive low  DISTORTION ratings. 
Transport costs  provide  another  reason  why  DISTORTION may  be 
unrelated  to  trade policies,  especially  in  a large  cross-section  of  coun- 
tries. Dollar's index would  be influenced  by geographic  variables such as 
access  to sea routes  and  distance  to world  markets,  even  when  LOP- 
appropriately  modified  to  allow  for  transport  costs-holds.  Hence  in 
practice  DISTORTION is  likely  to  capture  the  effects  of  geography  as 
well  as of exchange-rate  policies.  Indeed,  when  we regress Dollar's DIS- 
TORTION index  on the black-market premium  (a measure  of exchange- 
rate  policy),  a  set  of  continent  dummies,  and  two  trade-related  geo- Trade  Policy  and  Economic  Growth  *  277 
Table 1  EFFECT  OF GEOGRAPHICAL  AND 
EXCHANGE-RATE  POLICY  VARIABLES  ON 
DOLLAR'S  DISTORTION  INDEX 
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Heteroskedasticity-corrected  t-statistics  in  parentheses.  See  appendix  for 
variable  definitions.  Regressions  include  a constant  term  and  cover  only 
developing  countries.  Levels  of  statistical  significance  indicated  by  aster- 
isks: * 99%; **  95%, ***  90%. 
graphic variables  (the coastal length  over  total land  area and a dummy 
for tropical countries),  we  find that these  explain  more than 50% of the 
variation in Dollar's distortion index. Furthermore, two trade-policy vari- 
ables (tariffs and quotas) enter with  the wrong  sign  (Table 1)! 
To summarize,  DISTORTION is theoretically  appropriate as a measure 
of trade restrictions  when  three conditions  hold:  (1) there are no export 
taxes or subsidies  in use,  (2) LOP holds  continuously,  and (3) there are 
no  systematic  differences  in national  price levels  due  to transport costs 
and  other  geographic  factors.  Obviously,  all of these  requirements  are 
counterfactual.  Whether  one  believes  that  DISTORTION still provides 
useful  empirical  information  on trade regimes  depends  on one's  priors 278 *  RODRIGUEZ  & RODRIK 
regarding  the  practical  significance  of  the  three  limitations  expressed 
above.13 Our view  is that the second  and third of these-the  departure 
from  LOP  and  the  effect  of  geography-are  particularly  important  in 
practice.  We  regard  it  as  likely  that  it  is  the  variation  in  nominal 
exchange-rate  policies  and  geography,  and  not  the  variation  in  trade 
restrictions,  that drives the cross-sectional  variation  of DISTORTION. 
3.3 WHY  VARIABILITY? 
As mentioned  previously,  Dollar (1992) uses  his measure  of distortion  in 
conjunction  with  a measure  of variability, the latter being  the coefficient 
of variation of DISTORTION measured  on an annual basis.  He is driven 
to  do  this  because  the  country  rankings  using  DISTORTION produce 
some  "anomalies."  For example,  "Korea and  Taiwan have  the  highest 
distortion  measures  of the Asian  developing  economies"  and "the rank- 
ings  within  the developed  country  groups  are not very plausible"  (Dol- 
lar, 1992, pp. 530-531).  The ten least-distorted  countries by this measure 
include  not  only  Hong  Kong,  Thailand,  and Malta, but  also Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh,  Mexico,  South  Africa, Nepal,  Pakistan,  and Syria! Burma's 
rating (90) equals  that of the United  States.  Taiwan (116) is judged  more 
distorted  than Argentina  (113). Our discussion  above indicated  that DIS- 
TORTION is  highly  sensitive  to  the  form  in  which  trade  policies  are 
applied  and to exchange-rate policies  as well as omitted geographic  char- 
acteristics.  So such results  are not entirely  surprising. 
Dollar  states  that the  "number  of  anomalies  declines  substantially  if 
the  real  exchange  rate  distortion  measure  is  combined  with  real  ex- 
change  rate variability to produce  an outward  orientation index" (Dollar, 
1992, p. 531). He thus produces  a country  ranking based  on a weighted 
average of the DISTORTION and VARIABILITY  indices.  Since these  two 
indices  are entered  separately  in his  growth  regressions,  we  shall  not 
discuss  this combined  index  of "outward orientation" further. 
However,  we  do wish  to emphasize  the obvious  point  that the VARI- 
ABILITY index  has  little  to  do  with  trade  restrictions,  as  commonly 
understood,  or with  inward  or outward  orientation  per se.  What does 
VARIABILITY  really measure?  The ten countries  with  the highest  VARI- 
ABILITY  scores  are Iraq, Uganda,  Bolivia, El Salvador,  Nicaragua,  Guy- 
ana, Somalia,  Nigeria,  Ghana,  and Guatemala.  For the most  part, these 
are countries  that have  experienced  very  high  inflation  rates and/or se- 
13. The sensitivity of Dollar's index to these assumptions highlights a generic difficulty 
with regression-based  indices which use the residual  from a regression  to proxy for an 
excluded variable:  such indices capture  variations  in the excluded variable  accurately 
only as long as the model is correctly  and fully specified. If some variables  are  excluded 
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vere  political  disturbances  during  1976-1985.  It is plausible  that VARI- 
ABILITY  measures  economic  instability at large. In any case, it is unclear 
to us why  we  should  think of it as an indicator of trade orientation. 
3.4 EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
The first column  of Table 2 shows  our replication of the core Dollar (1992) 
result  for 95 developing  countries.  Dollar's  benchmark  specification  in- 
cludes  on  the  right-hand  side  the  investment  rate (as a share  of GDP, 
averaged  over  1976-1985)  in addition  to DISTORTION and VARIABIL- 
ITY.  As shown  in column (1), DISTORTION and VARIABILITY  both enter 
with negative  and highly  significant  coefficients  using  this specification. 
[Our results  are virtually  identical  to  those  in  Dollar  (1992),  with  the 
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difference  that our t-statistics  are based  on heteroskedasticity-corrected 
standard  errors.] 
None  of Dollar's  runs  include  standard  regressors  such  as initial in- 
come,  education,  and regional  dummies.  The other  columns  of Table 2 
show  the results  as we  alter Dollar's  specification  to make it more com- 
patible  with  recent  cross-national  work  on  growth  (e.g.,  Barro, 1997). 
First, we  add regional  dummies  for Latin America,  East Asia,  and sub- 
Saharan Africa to ensure  that the results  are not  due  to omitted  factors 
correlated  with  geographical  location  (column  2). Next  we  drop  the in- 
vestment  rate (column  3), and add in succession  initial income  (column 
4) and initial schooling  (column 5).14  The dummies  for Latin America and 
sub-Saharan  Africa  are negative  and  statistically  significant.  Initial in- 
come  and  education  also  enter  significantly,  with  the  expected  signs 
(negative  and positive,  respectively). 
We find  that the VARIABILITY  index  is robust to these  changes,  but 
that  DISTORTION  is  not.  In  fact,  as  soon  as  we  introduce  regional 
dummies  in the  regression,  the  estimated  coefficient  on  DISTORTION 
comes  down  sizably and becomes  insignificant.  Whatever DISTORTION 
may be  measuring,  this  raises  the  possibility  that the  results  with  this 
index  are spurious,  arising  from the  index's  correlation  with  (omitted) 
regional effects. 
Dollar's  original  results  were  based  on  data  from  Mark 4.0  of  the 
Summers-Heston  database (Summers and Heston,  1988). We have recal- 
culated Dollar's DISTORTION and VARIABILITY  indices using the more 
recent version  (Mark 5.6) of the Summers-Heston  data,  confining  our- 
selves  to the  same  period  examined  by Dollar (1976-1985).  The revised 
data allow us to generate  these  indices  for 112 developing  countries.  We 
have  also rerun the regressions  for cross sections  over different periods, 
as well as in panel form with fixed effects.  We do not report these  results 
here,  for reasons  of space  (see the working-paper  version  of this paper, 
Rodriguez  and Rodrik, 1999). The bottom  line that emerges  is similar to 
the conclusion  just stated: the estimated  coefficient  on VARIABILITY  is 
generally  robust  to alterations  in specifications;  the  coefficient  on  DIS- 
TORTION is not. 
4. Jeffrey  Sachs  and  Andrew  Warner  (1995) 
We turn next  to the  paper  "Economic reform and the process  of global 
integration" by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew  Warner (1995). This extremely 
14. The  income  variable  comes  from  the  Summers-Heston  (Mark 4.0)  data  set  used  in 
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influential  paper15 is  an  ambitious  attempt  to  solve  the  measurement- 
error problem in the literature by constructing  an index of openness  that 
combines  information  about several  aspects  of trade policy. The Sachs- 
Warner (SW) openness  indicator  (OPEN) is a zero-one  dummy,  which 
takes the value  0 if the economy  was  closed  according  to any one  of the 
following  criteria: 
1.  it had average tariff rates higher  than 40% (TAR); 
2.  its nontariff  barriers covered  on  average  more  than  40% of imports 
(NTB); 
3.  it had a socialist  economic  system  (SOC); 
4.  it had a state monopoly  of major exports  (MON); 
5.  its black-market premium  exceeded  20% during  either the decade  of 
the 1970s or the decade  of the 1980s (BMP).16 
The rationale for combining  these  indicators into a single dichotomous 
variable is that they represent  different ways  in which  policymakers  can 
close their economy  to international  trade. Tariffs set at 50% have exactly 
the same resource-allocation  implications  as quotas at a level  that raised 
domestic  market prices  for importables  by  50%. To gauge  the  effect  of 
openness  on  growth,  it is necessary  to use  a variable that classifies  as 
closed  those  countries  that were  able to effectively  restrict their econo- 
mies' integration  into world markets through  the use of different combi- 
nations  of policies  that would  achieve  that result.  Furthermore,  if these 
openness  indicators are correlated among themselves,  introducing  them 
separately  in a regression  may not yield  reliable estimates,  due  to their 
possibly  high  level of collinearity. 
The SW dummy  has  a high  and  robust  coefficient  when  inserted  in 
growth  regressions.  The point  estimate  of its effect  on  growth  (in the 
original benchmark  specification)  is 2.44 percentage  points17: economies 
that pass  all five requirements  experience  on average  economic  growth 
two  and  a half percentage  points  higher  than  those  that do not.  The t- 
statistic  is  5.50  (5.83  if  estimated  using  robust  standard  errors).  This 
coefficient  appears  to be highly  robust to changes  in the list of controls: 
in a recent paper which  subjects 58 potential  determinants  of growth  to 
15. A partial listing of papers that have made use of the Sachs-Warner  index includes  Hall 
and Jones (1998), Wacziarg (1998), Sala-i-Martin (1997), Burnside and Dollar (1997), and 
Collins  and Bosworth  (1996). 
16. Sachs and Warner use data from the following  sources: Lee (1993) for nontariff barriers, 
Barro and  Lee  (1993) for  tariffs,  World  Bank  (1994) for  state  monopoly  of  exports, 
Komai  (1992) for the  classification  of  socialist  and  nonsocial  countries,  and  Interna- 
tional Currency Analysis  (various years) for black-market premia. 
17. In the  long  run,  such  an economy  would  converge  to a level  of per capita GDP 2.97 
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an exhaustive  sensitivity  analysis,  the average  p-value for the SW index 
is less than 0.1%.18 
In this  section  we  ask  several  questions  about  Sachs  and  Warner's 
results.  First, we  ask which,  if any, of the individual  components  of the 
index  are responsible  for the  strength  of the  SW dummy.  We find that 
the  SW dummy's  strength  derives  mainly  from the  combination  of the 
black-market  premium  (BMP)  and  the  state-monopoly-of-exports 
(MON) variables.  Very little of the dummy's  statistical power  would  be 
lost if it were  constructed  using  only  these  two indicators.  In particular, 
there  is little  action  in  the  two  variables  that are the  most  direct  mea- 
sures of trade policy: tariff and nontariff barriers (TAR and NTB). 
We  then  ask  to  what  extent  the  black-market  premium  and  state- 
monopoly  variables  are measures  of trade policy. We suggest  that their 
significance  in explaining  growth  can be traced to their correlation with 
other  determinants  of growth:  macroeconomic  problems  in the  case  of 
the  black-market  premium,  and  location  in  sub-Saharan  Africa in  the 
case of the state-monopoly  variable.  We conclude  that the SW indicator 
serves  as a proxy for a wide  range of policy and institutional  differences, 
and that it yields  an upward-biased  estimate of the effects of trade restric- 
tions proper. 
4.1 WHICH  INDIVIDUAL  VARIABLES  ACCOUNT  FOR  THE 
SIGNIFICANCE  OF THE  SW DUMMY? 
We start by  contrasting  Sachs  and  Warner's result  with  the  results  of 
controlling  separately for individual  components  of their index.  Column 
1 of Table 3 reproduces  their baseline  regression,  and  column  2 shows 
what happens  when  each of the components  of the SW index is inserted 
separately  into  the  same  specification.19 The variables  BMP and  MON 
are highly  significant,  whereas  the  rest are not.  An  F-test for the joint 
significance  of the other three components  (SOC, TAR, and NTB) yields 
a p-value of 0.25. 
18. Sala-i-Martin  (1997). The variable used by Sala-i-Martin  is the number of years an 
economy was open according  to the SW criteria,  whereas here we follow Sachs and 
Wamer's  (1995)  original article  and use a dummy which captures  whether or not the 
economy was open during 1970-1989. 
19. We use the same set of controls used by Sachs and Warner.  These are log of GDP n 
1970, secondary schooling in 1970, primary  schooling in 1970, government consump- 
tion as a percentage of GDP, number of revolutions and coups per year, number of 
assassinations per million population, relative price of investment goods, and ratio 
of investment to GDP.  However, our results are highly robust to changes in the list of 
controls.  For  example, the simple correlations  of TAR,  NTB, and SOC  with growth are, 
respectively,  -.048,  -.083 and -.148. Our result  is also not due to multicollinearity:  the 
R2's  from regressions  of any one of SOC, NTB, and TAR  on the other two are, respec- 
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Table  3  EFFECT  OF DIFFERENT  QPENNESS  INDICATORS  ON GROWTH 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 














2.119*  2.519*  2.063* 
(5.09)  (5.94)  (4.64) 
0.877**  0.735  0.663 





0.593  0.637  0.522  0.455  0.617  0.522  0.619 
79  71  78  75  74  74  74 
Dependent variable:  growth of GDP per capita, 1970-1989. All equations except that for column 6 
include the following controls:  log of GDP  in 1970,  investment  rate  in 1970,  government  consumption/ 
GDP, assassinations  per capita, deviation from world investment prices, secondary-schooling  ratio, 
primary-schooling  ratio,  revolutions  and coups, and a constant  term. Column  6 drops the investment 
rate and deviation from world investment prices. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics  based on 
Huber-White  heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors. 
To check whether  it is mainly  the combination  of BMP and MON  that 
drives  the  Sachs  and  Warner's  result,  we  ask  the  following  question: 
suppose  that we  had built a dummy  variable, in the spirit of Sachs and 
Warner, which  classified  an  economy  as  closed  only  if  it  was  closed 
according  to BMP and MON.  That is,  suppose  we  ignored  the informa- 
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How  significant  would  the  coefficient  of  our  variable  be  in  a growth 
regression? How  different would  the partition between  open  and closed 
economies  that it generates  be from that generated  by the SW dummy? 
Suppose  alternatively  that  we  also  constructed  an  openness  dummy 
based  only  on the information  contained  in SOC,  NTB, and TAR. How 
significant  would  that  variable  be  in  a  growth  regression?  And  how 
correlated would  it be with  the SW index? 
Columns  (3)-(6)  of Table 3 address  the  question  of  significance.  We 
denote  by  BM a variable  that  takes  the  value  1 when  the  economy  is 
open  according to criteria 4 and 5 above, whereas  SQT equals 1 when  the 
economy  passes  criteria 1, 2, and 3. We substitute  these  variables for the 
SW openness  index  in the regression  Sachs and Warner present  in their 
paper.  Entered on  its own,  BM is highly  significant,  with  an estimated 
coefficient  that is very  close  to that on OPEN (2.09 vs.  2.44; see column 
3). When SQT is substituted  for BM, the estimated  coefficient  on SQT is 
much smaller (0.88) and significant  only at the 90% level  (column 4). We 
next enter BM and SQT simultaneously:  the coefficient of SQT now has a 
t-statistic  of  1.59,  whereas  the  coefficient  on  BM retains  a t-statistic  of 
5.09 and a point  estimate  (2.12) close to that on the openness  variable in 
the  original  equation  (column  5). Once  the investment  rate and invest- 
ment  prices,  which  are likely  to be  endogenous,  are taken  out  of  the 
equation,  the t-statistic on SQT drops to 1.30 and that on BM rises to 5.94 
(column  6). 
The  comparability  of  the  results  in Table 3 is hampered  by  the  fact 
that the sample  size  changes  as we  move  from one  column  to the next. 
This  is because  not  all of the  79 countries  in the  sample  have  data for 
each  of  the  individual  SW  components.  To check  whether  this  intro- 
duces  any  difficulties  for  our  interpretation,  we  have  also  run  these 
regressions  holding  the  sample  size  fixed.  We restricted  the  sample  to 
those  countries  which  have  the  requisite  data  for all the  components, 
using  both  the  original  specification  (n =  71) and a specification  where 
we  drop two  of the SW regressors  with  t-statistics below  unity  (primary 
schooling,  and  revolutions  and  coups)  to  gain  additional  observations 
(n = 74). In both cases,  our results were  similar to those  reported above: 
Regardless  of  whether  BM and  SQT are entered  separately  or jointly, 
the coefficient  on BM is highly  significant  (with  a point  estimate  that is 
statistically  indistinguishable  from that on OPEN) while  the coefficient 
on SQT is insignificant.20 
Hence,  once BM is included,  there is little additional  predictive  power 
20. The largest  t-statistic we  obtained  for SQT in these  runs  is 1.4.  These  results  are not 
shown,  to save space,  but are available on request. Trade  Policy and Economic  Growth ?  285 
coming  from  regime  type  (socialist  or not),  level  of tariffs,  or coverage  of 
nontariff  barriers.21  The  strength  of  the  SW  index  derives  from  the  low 
growth  performance  of  countries  with  either  high  black-market  premia 
or state  export  monopolies  (as  classified  by  Sachs  and  Warner).22 
The  reason  why  BM  performs  so  much  better  than  SQT  is  that  BM 
generates  a partition  between  closed  and  open  economies  that  is  much 
closer  to  that  generated  by  OPEN  than  the  partition  generated  by  SQT. 
Only  six  economies  are classified  differently  by  BM and  by  OPEN,  while 
OPEN  and  SQT  disagree  in  31 cases.  The  disagreement  between  OPEN 
and  SQT  is concentrated  in  15 African  and  12 Latin  American  economies 
which  SQT  fails  to  qualify  as  closed  but  BM (and  therefore  OPEN)  does: 
the  African  economies  are  found  to  be  closed  because  of  their  state 
monopolies  of exports,  and  those  of Latin  America  because  of their  high 
black-market  premia.  The  average  rate  of  growth  of  these  economies  is 
0.24,  much  lower  than  the  sample  average  of  1.44.23 
In  view  of  the  overwhelming  contribution  of  the  black-market  pre- 
mium  and  the  dummy  for  state  monopoly  of  exports  to  the  statistical 
performance  of the  SW openness  index,  it is logical  to ask  what  exactly  it 
is  that  these  two  variables  are  capturing.  To what  extent  are they  indica- 
tors  of  trade  policy?  Could  they  be  correlated  with  other  variables  that 
have  a detrimental  effect  on  growth,  therefore  not  giving  us  much  useful 
information  on  trade  openness  per  se?  We  turn  now  to  these  questions, 
first  with  an  analysis  of  the  state-monopoly-of-exports  variable,  and 
then  with  a discussion  of the  black-market  premium  variable. 
21 A different  form  in which the "horse  race"  can be run, suggested to us by Jeffrey  Sachs, 
is to introduce  OPEN  and BM  together  in the regression,  to see if OPEN  clearly  "wins." 
When we  do this, we  find that the point estimate of the coefficient on OPEN is 
generally  larger  than that on BM,  but that the two coefficients  are statistically  indistin- 
guishable  from each other,  because OPEN  and BM  are highly collinear  with each other 
(as we discuss further  below). On the other hand, when OPEN and SQT are entered 
together,  SQT  has the wrong (negative)  sign and the equality  of coefficients  can easily 
be rejected. 
22. Harrison  and Hanson (1999)  have studied the SW dummy and reach a similar  conclu- 
sion,  namely that the effect of trade-policy indicators (tariffs and quotas) on the 
strength  of the SW  dummy is small  and not significant.  The key difference  between our 
work and Harrison  and Hanson's is that they introduce  the subcomponents  of the SW 
index separately  in their regression  whereas we construct  the subindexes described  in 
the text. 
23. Our result is not due to an arbitrary  distinction  between BM and SQT.  SQT  performs 
more  poorly than any other openness index constructed  on the basis of three  of the five 
indicators  used by Sachs and Warer, and BM  performs  more strongly  than any index 
constructed with two of these five indicators. A similar result applies to partitions 
along other dimensions:  those constructed  using four indicators  which exclude either 
BMP  or MON do more  poorly than any of those which include  them;  and either  BMP  or 
MON individually  does better than any of the other indicators.  Details of these exer- 
cises can be found in the working-paper  version of our paper (Rodriguez  and Rodrik, 
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4.2 WHAT  DOES  THE  STATE-MONOPOLY-OF-EXPORTS  VARIABLE 
REPRESENT? 
Sachs and Warner's rationale for using  an indicator of the existence  of a 
state  monopoly  on  major  exports  is  the  well-known  equivalence  be- 
tween  import  and  export  taxes  (Lerner,  1936).  The  variable  MON  is 
meant  to capture  cases  in which  governments  taxed  major exports  and 
therefore  reduced  the  level  of  trade  (exports  and imports).  Sachs  and 
Warner use an index of the degree of distortion caused by export market- 
ing  boards,  taken  from the  World Bank study  Adjustment in Africa: Re- 
forms, Results, and the Road  Ahead (World Bank, 1994).24 
We note  that the World bank study  covers  only 29 African economies 
that were under structural adjustment  programs  from 1987 to 1991. This 
results  in  a  double  selection  bias.  First,  non-African  economies  with 
restrictive  policies  towards  exports  automatically  escape  scrutiny.  Sec- 
ond,  African economies  with restrictive export policies  but not undergo- 
ing  adjustment  programs  in  the  late  1980s  are also  overlooked.  Since 
Africa was  the  slowest-growing  region  during  the  period  covered,  and 
since  economies  that need  to carry out structural adjustment  programs 
are likely  to be doing  worse  than those  that do not,  the effect is to bias 
the coefficient  on openness  upwards  on both  accounts. 
How  this  selection  bias affects  the  country  classification  can be illus- 
trated by two  examples:  Indonesia  and Mauritius.  Both of these  econo- 
mies are rated as open  in Sachs and Warner's sample.  Both are excluded 
from the  sample  used  to construct  the  state-monopoly-on-exports  vari- 
able: Indonesia  because  it is not in Africa, and Mauritius because  it was 
doing  well  and was  not undergoing  a World Bank adjustment  program 
during  the  period  covered  by  the  World Bank study.  Yet both  of these 
economies  would  seem  to satisfy the conditions  necessary  to be rated as 
closed  according  to  the  export-monopoly  criterion: Indonesian  law  re- 
stricts oil and  gas  production  to the  state  oil company,  Pertamina; and 
Mauritius  sells  all of its export  sugar production  through  the Mauritius 
Sugar  Syndicate.25  Indonesia  and  Mauritius  are  also  among  the  ten 
fastest-growing  economies  in Sachs and Warner's sample. 
24. Sachs  and Warner (1995) cite a different  source  in their paper,  but World Bank (1994) 
appears to be the correct source. 
25. See  Pertamina  (1998) for Indonesia,  and  Gulhati  and  Nallari  (1990, p.  22) as well  as 
World Bank (1989, p. 6) for Mauritius. Oil represented  61.2% of Indonesian  exports and 
sugar represented  between  60-80% of Mauritius exports during the period  covered by 
Sachs and Warer's  study  (see World Bank, 1983, Table E, and 1998). Although  manu- 
factures have  recently  outstripped  sugar  as Mauritius's  main  export,  this  is a recent 
development:  in 1980 sugar represented  65% of Mauritius's  total exports,  and agricul- 
ture was surpassed  by manufacturing  as the main source of exports only in 1986 (World 
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One  of  the  problems  that  this  selection  bias  causes  in  Sachs  and 
Warner's estimation  is that it makes the variable MON virtually indistin- 
guishable  from  a  sub-Saharan  Africa  dummy.26 There  are  13 African 
countries  (out  of 47) in Sachs and Warner's study  that are not  rated as 
closed  according  to MON.  (Twelve of these  were not included  in World 
Bank study.)  But for all but  one  of  these  observations  MON  adds  no 
additional information,  either because  they are dropped  from the sample 
due to unavailability  of other data or because  they are rated as closed  by 
other  trade-policy  indicators  used  to construct  the  index.  The result  is 
that  the  only  difference  between  having  used  an  export-marketing- 
board variable to construct the SW index and having  used a sub-Saharan 
Africa dummy  is a single  observation.  That observation  is Mauritius, the 
fastest-growing  African economy  in the sample.27 
We  conclude  that  the  export-marketing-board  variable,  as  imple- 
mented,  is not a good  measure  of trade policy  and creates a serious bias 
in  the  estimation.  Except  for  Mauritius,  whose  classification  as  open 
seems  to us to be due exclusively  to selection bias, the inclusion  of MON 
in  the  SW dummy  is indistinguishable  from the  use  of  a sub-Saharan 
Africa dummy.  In that respect,  the only information  that we  can extract 
from it is that African economies  grew  more slowly  than the rest of the 
world  during the seventies  and eighties. 
4.3 WHAT  DOES  THE  BLACK-MARKET  PREMIUM 
VARIABLE  MEASURE? 
The second  source  of strength  in the SW openness  variable is the black- 
market premium.  Indeed,  the simple  correlation between  the openness 
dummy  and  BMP is 0.63.  A regression  of growth  on  the black-market 
premium  dummy  and all the other controls  gives  a coefficient  of  -1.05 
with a t-statistic of nearly 2.5 in absolute value.  How good an indicator of 
openness  is the black-market premium? 
The  black-market  premium  measures  the  extent  of  rationing  in  the 
market  for  foreign  currency.  The  theoretical  argument  for  using  the 
black-market premium  in this context  is that,  under  certain conditions, 
foreign  exchange  restrictions  act as a trade barrier. Using  our notation 
from the previous  section  (but omitting  country subscripts),  the domes- 
26. This is true despite  the fact that the SW dummy's  coefficient  is still significant after the 
estimation  is carried out controlling for a sub-Saharan Africa dummy. The reason is that 
the SW dummy  still has substantial  explanatory  power  left due  to its use  of the black- 
market premium  variable. 
27. Both Lesotho  and Botswana  had higher  growth  rates than Mauritius, but Lesotho was 
not  rated  due  to  insufficient  data  (Sachs  and  Warer  1995, p.  85),  and  Botswana  is 
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tic price  of  import-competing  goods  relative  to  exportables  can be  ex- 
pressed  as follows: 
pm  empm  (1  +  tm)(l +  tX) 
px  px 
where  an asterisk refers to border prices.  We now  allow for the possibil- 
ity that the exchange  rates applicable  to import and export transactions 
(em  and e,  respectively)  can differ. Foreign-currency rationing can drive a 
wedge  between  these  two exchange  rates. 
Suppose  the  form  that  rationing  takes  is  as  follows:  all imports  are 
financed  at the margin by buying  foreign  currency in the black market, 
while  all export  receipts  are handed  to  the  central bank  at the  official 
exchange  rate. In this case, em/ex  = 1 + BMP, and the presence  of a black- 
market  premium  has  the  same  resource-allocation  consequences  as  a 
trade restriction.  On the  other hand,  if at the margin  exporters can sell 
their  foreign-currency  receipts  on  the  black  market  as  well,  then  the 
wedge  between  em  and ex disappears.  In this case,  the black-market pre- 
mium does not work like a trade restriction.28 Neither does it do so when 
the premium  for foreign currency is generated  by restrictions on capital- 
account  (as opposed  to current-account)  transactions. 
But  there  is  a  deeper  problem  with  interpreting  the  black-market 
premium  as  an  indicator  of  trade  policy.  Sachs  and  Warner  rate  an 
economy  closed  according  to BMP if it maintains  black-market  premia 
in  excess  of  20% for  a  whole  decade  (the  1970s  or  the  1980s).  Such 
levels  of  the  black-market  premium  are indicative  of sustained  macro- 
economic  imbalances.  Overvaluation  of  this  magnitude  is  likely  to 
emerge  (1)  when  there  is  a  deep  inconsistency  between  domestic 
aggregate-demand  policies  and  exchange-rate  policy,  or  (2) when  the 
government  tries to maintain  a low exchange  rate in order to counteract 
transitory  confidence  or balance-of-payments  crises.  Such  imbalances 
may be sparked by political conflicts,  external shocks,  or sheer misman- 
agement,  and would  typically  manifest  themselves  in inflationary  pres- 
sures,  high  and growing  levels  of external debt,  and a stop-go  pattern 
of policymaking.  In addition,  since  black-market  premia  tend  to  favor 
government  officials who  can trade exchange-rate  allocations  for bribes, 
we  would  expect  them  to  be  high  wherever  there  are high  levels  of 
corruption.  Therefore,  countries  with  greater corruption,  a less  reliable 
28. In one respect,  Sachs and Warner (1995) treat BMP differently  from a trade restriction: 
the cutoff for tariffs (TAR) is set at 40%, while  that for BMP is set at 20%. Trade  Policy  and  Economic  Growth  *  289 
bureaucracy, and lower  capacity  for enforcement  of the  rule of law  are 
also likely have higher black-market premia. 
Hence  it is reasonable  to suppose  that the  existence  of sizable  black- 
market premia over long  periods  of time reflects a wide  range of policy 
failures. It is also reasonable  to think that these  failures will be responsi- 
ble for low  growth.  What is more  debatable,  in our view,  is the attribu- 
tion  of  the  adverse  growth  consequences  exclusively  to  the  trade- 
restrictive effects of black-market premia. 
Many  of the relationships  just discussed  are present  in the data. The 
simple correlations of black-market premia with the level of inflation,  the 
debt/exports  ratio, wars, and institutional  quality are all sufficiently high 
to warrant preoccupation.  Indeed,  of the 48 economies  ranked as closed 
according  to  the  BMP criteria, 40  had  one  or  more  of  the  following 
characteristics: average  inflation over 1975-1990  higher  than 10%, debt- 
to-GNP ratio in 1985 greater than 125%, a terms-of-trade  decline of more 
than 20%, an institutional-quality  index less than 5 (on a scale of 1 to 10), 
or involvement  in a war. 
We also view  the fact that there exist important threshold  effects in the 
black-market premium as indicative  that this variable may simply be cap- 
turing the effect of widespread  macroeconomic  and political crises. If we 
insert the values  of the black-market premium  in the 1970s and 1980s as 
continuous  variables in the regression,  the estimated  coefficients  are ex- 
tremely weak,  and they fail to pass an F-test for joint significance  at 10%. 
The strength  of Sachs and Warner's result comes  in great part from the 
dichotomous  nature of the variable BMP and from the fact that the 20% 
threshold  allows  more weight  to be placed on the observations  for which 
the  black-market  premia-and  probably  also  the  underlying  macro- 
economic  imbalances-are  sufficiently  high. 
That the effect of the black-market premium  is highly  sensitive  to the 
macroeconomic  and political  variables that one  controls for is shown  in 
Table 4,  where  we  present  the  results  of  controlling  for  each  of  the 
indicators  of  macroeconomic  and  political  distress  that  we  have  men- 
tioned.  In three out of five cases,  each of these  variables individually  is 
enough  to  drive  the  coefficient  on  BMP below  conventional  levels  of 
significance.  If we  insert all our controls  together,  the estimated  coeffi- 
cient  on  BMP goes  down  by  more  than  half  and  the  t-statistic  drops 
below  1. 
This kind of evidence  does not by itself prove that higher black-market 
premia  are  unrelated  to  growth  performance.  The  results  in  Table 4 
might  be  due  to high  multicollinearity  between  the  black-market  pre- 
mium and the indicators of macroeconomic  and political distress  that we 
have chosen.  But what they do show  is that there is very little in the data Table 4  EFFECT  OF BLACK-MARKET PREMIUM ON  GROWTH BEFORE AND  AFTER CONTROLLING FOR 
MEASURES OF MACROECONOMIC  AND  POLITICAL DISEQUILIBRIUM; 
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to help us distinguish  the effect of high black-market premia from those 
of  other  plausible  right-hand-side  variables  relating  to macroeconomic 
distress.  In other  words,  they  show  that  the  black-market  premium  is 
not  a good  measure  of trade policy, because  it is also a proxy  for many 
other variables unrelated  to trade policy. 
4.4 SENSITIVITY  AND GENERAL  IMPLICATIONS 
The  interpretational  problems  with  the  state-monopoly-of-exports  and 
black-market premium  variables would  not be so important if these  two 
variables were  responsible  for only part of the effect of the SW index on 
growth.  But the fact that they seem  to be its overwhelming  determinant 
makes  us  worry  about  the  extent  to which  the  results  speak  meaning- 
fully about the role of trade policies. 
The  arguments  in  the  previous  two  sections  have  shown  that  the 
individual  coefficients  on MON  and BMP are not very robust to control- 
ling  for  variables  such  as  an  Africa  dummy  or  indicators  of  macro- 
economic  and political  distress.  However,  much  of the force of the SW 
variable comes from its combination  of the effects of MON and BMP.  The 
reason is that the SW dummy  uses  MON to classify as closed all but one 
of the economies  in sub-Saharan Africa and then uses  BMP to classify as 
closed  a set of economies  with  macroeconomic  and political difficulties. 
It thus builds  a "supervariable" which  is 1 for all non-African economies 
without  macroeconomic  or political  difficulties.  This variable will be sta- 
tistically stronger than either an African dummy  or macroeconomic  con- 
trols, because  it jointly groups  information  from both.29 
In the  working-paper  version  of  this  paper  (Rodriguez  and  Rodrik, 
1999) we  show  that the coefficient  on the SW variable,  although  gener- 
ally robust  to changes  in the list of controls,  is particularly sensitive  to 
the inclusion  of other summary  indicators  of macroeconomic  and politi- 
cal crises. In particular, both the summary  indicator of institutional  qual- 
ity developed  by  Knack and  Keefer (1995) and  a dummy  variable that 
captures  the  effect  of  being  in  Africa  and  high  macroeconomic  dis- 
equilibria can easily  drive the coefficient  of the SW dummy  below  con- 
ventional  significance  levels.  This sensitivity  is important not because  it 
shows  the existence  of a specification  in which  the SW dummy's  signifi- 
cance  is not  robust,  but because  this  lack of robustness  shows  up  pre- 
cisely  when  it is other indicators  of political  and macroeconomic  imbal- 
ances that are introduced  in the regression.  This appears to suggest  that 
29. If MON  and BMP are inserted  separately,  together  with  an Africa dummy  and a mea- 
sure of institutional  quality, then neither MON nor BMP is individually  significant,  and 
the p-value for a joint significance  test is 0.09 (0.31 after controlling  for NTB, TAR, and 
SOC), but OPEN gets a t-statistic of 3.06 and BM one of 2.93 (SQT gets  1.46). 292 *  RODRIGUEZ  & RODRIK 
the  SW variable  may  be  acting  as a proxy  for these  imbalances  rather 
than as an indicator of trade policy. 
We do not pretend to have a good answer to the question of whether it is 
macroeconomic  and political distress  that drive trade policy  or the other 
way around.30 Nor do we give an answer to the question  of whether  all of 
these  are determined  in turn by some  other underlying  variables such as 
poor institutions  or antimarket ideology.  What we believe  we have estab- 
lished is that the statistical power of the SW indicator derives not from the 
direct indicators of trade policy it incorporates,  but from two components 
that we have reasons to believe  will yield upward-biased  estimates  of the 
effects of trade restrictions. The SW measure is so correlated with plausi- 
ble groupings  of alternative explanatory variables-macroeconomic  insta- 
bility, poor institutions,  location in Africa-that  it is risky to draw strong 
inferences  about the effect of openness  on growth based on its coefficient 
in a growth  regression. 
5.  Sebastian  Edwards  (1998) 
The third paper  that we  discuss  is Sebastian Edwards's  recent Economic 
Journal paper  "Openness,  productivity  and  growth:  What do we  really 
know?"  (Edwards,  1998).  The  papers  by  Dollar  and  by  Sachs  and 
Warner deal with  data problems  by constructing  new  openness  indica- 
tors.  Edwards  takes  the  alternative  approach  of  analyzing  the  robust- 
ness  of the openness-growth  relationship  to the use of different existing 
indicators.  Edwards writes: "the difficulties  in defining  satisfactory sum- 
mary  indexes  suggest  that  researchers  should  move  away  from  this 
area,  and  should  instead  concentrate  on  determining  whether  econo- 
metric results  are robust to alternative  indexes"  (1998, p.  386). The pre- 
sumption  is that the imperfections  in specific indicators would  not seem 
quite  as relevant  if the estimated  positive  coefficient  on openness  were 
found  to be robust to differences  in the way  openness  is measured. 
To carry out  this  robustness  analysis,  Edwards  runs  regressions  of 
total factor productivity  growth  on nine  alternative  indicators  of open- 
ness.  (Initial income  and a measure  of schooling  are used  as controls.31) 
30. Sachs  and  Warner's  view  is  that  causality  goes  from  restrictive  trade  policies  to 
macroeconomic  instability  (personal  communication  with  Sachs).  For the purposes  of 
the present paper, we  are agnostic  about the existence  or direction of any causality. An 
argument  that macroeconomic  imbalances  are largely unrelated  to trade policies  is not 
difficult to make,  and receives  considerable  support  from cross-national  evidence  (see 
Rodrik, 1999, Chap.  4). 
31. In an earlier and heavily  cited paper, Edwards  (1992) carried out a similar analysis  for 
growth  rates of real GDP per capita using  a somewhat  different  set of nine  alternative 
indicators  of trade-policy  distortions.  We focus  here  on  Edwards  (1998) because  it is 
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His estimates  of total factor productivity  growth  are the Solow  residuals 
from panel regressions  of growth  on changes  of capital and labor inputs. 
The nine indicators of openness  he uses  are: (1) the SW openness  index; 
(2) the World Bank's subjective  classification  of trade strategies  in World 
Development  Report  1987; (3) Leamer's (1988) openness  index,  built on the 
basis  of  the  average  residuals  from regressions  of  trade  flows;  (4) the 
average  black-market  premium;  (5)  the  average  import  tariffs  from 
UNCTAD via Barro and Lee (1994); (6) the average coverage  of nontariff 
barriers, also from UNCTAD via Barro and Lee (1994); (7) the subjective 
Heritage  Foundation  index  of distortions  in international  trade; (8) the 
ratio of total revenues  on trade taxes (exports  +  imports)  to total trade; 
and (9) Holger Wolf's (1993) regression-based  index of import distortions 
for 1985. 
The results Edwards presents are weighted  least squares (WLS) regres- 
sions  of TFP growth  on indicators  (1)-(9),  where  the weighting  variable 
is GDP per  capita in  1985. They  are shown  in column  1, rows  1-9,  of 
Table 5: six of the nine indicators are significant,  and all but one have the 
"expected"  sign.  He  repeats  the  analysis  using  instrumental  weighted 
least squares  (column  2), and finds  five of nine  indicators  significant  at 
10% (three at 5%) and all having  the "correct" sign.32 He also builds  an 
additional indicator as the first principal component  of indicators (1), (4), 
(5), (6), and (9), which  he finds to be significant  in WLS estimation  (row 
10). He  concludes  that "these  results  are quite  remarkable,  suggesting 
with  tremendous  consistency  that there is a significantly  positive  rela- 
tionship  between  openness  and productivity  growth." 
We will argue that Edwards's  evidence  does  not warrant such  strong 
claims.  The robustness  of the regression  results,  we will show,  is largely 
an artifact of weighting  and identification  assumptions  that seem to us to 
be inappropriate.  Of the 19 different specifications  reported in Edwards 
(1998), only three produce  results  that are statistically  significant at con- 
ventional  levels  once  we  qualify  these  assumptions.  Furthermore,  the 
specifications  that pass  econometric  scrutiny are based  on data that suf- 
fer from serious  anomalies  and subjectivity bias. 
5.1 THE  PROBLEM  WITH  WEIGHTING 
The justification  for the resort to WLS estimation  is not provided  in the 
paper,  but it is presumably  to correct for possible  heteroskedasticity  in 
the  residuals.  If  disturbances  are  not  homoskedastic,  ordinary  least- 
squares estimates  will be inefficient.  If the form of the skedastic function 
32. In his paper,  Edwards  erroneously  claims that two  additional  variables  are significant 
in  the  IV-2SLS  estimation:  Leamer's  index  and  tariffs. This mistake  was  apparently 
due to two typographical  errors in his Table 4, p. 393. Table 5  ALTERNATIVE WEIGHTING ASSUMPTIONS 
(1)  (2) 
Weighted  least 
squares  Weighted  2SLS 
Openness  indicator  (weight=GDP)  (weight=GDP) 
1. Sachs-Wamer  0.0094**  0.0089*** 
(2.12)  (1.84) 
2. World Development  0.0075*  0.0131* 
Report  (3.57)  (3.36) 
3. Leamer  0.0010  0.0123 
(1.03)  (1.40) 
4. Black-market premium  -0.0217*  -0.0192*** 
(-3.59)  (-1.95) 
5. Tariffs  -0.0450*  -0.1001 
(-2.77)  (-1.52) 
(3) 
Weighted  least 
squares 












Weighted  2SLS 





































(0.28) 6. Quotas  -0.0047  -0.0398  0.0029  0.0461  0.0036  0.0401 
(-0.45)  (-0.42)  (0.35)  (0.68)  (0.43)  (0.79) 
7. Heritage Foundation  -0.0074*  -0.0133*  -0.0066**  -0.0195*  -0.0064*  -0.0202* 
(-4.50)  (-3.75)  (-3.02)  (-3.30)  (-2.87)  (-3.24) 
8. Collected-trade-taxes  -0.4849*  -1.6668**  -0.2808**  -1.8256  -0.2676**  -1.8368 
ratio  (3.04)  (-2.15)  (-2.15)  (-1.23)  (-2.25)  (-1.06) 
9. Wolf's index of import  3.5E-05  -2.6E-04  4.8E-05  -3.7E-04  4.1E-05  -3.3E-04 
distortions  (0.27)  (-0.72)  (0.41)  (-0.99)  (0.36)  (-1.21) 
10. Principal-components  -0.0070**  -0.0047  -0.0043 
factor  (-2.38)  (-1.61)  (-1.37) 
Dependent variable:  TFP  growth, 1980-1990.  These are the estimated coefficients from regressions where each of the trade-policy  indicators  is entered separately.  Each 
equation  also includes  log GDP  per capita  in 1965  and schooling  in 1965  as regressors  [as in the original  Edwards  (1998)  specification].  t-statistics  are  in parentheses  (based  on 
heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors  in column 3). 296 *  RODRfGUEZ  & RODRIK 
is known,  then  it is appropriate  to use  WLS. This is indeed  what  Ed- 
wards implicitly  assumes  when  he uses  GDP per capita as his weighting 
variable.  If it  is  unknown,  White's  (1980) covariance-matrix  estimator 
allows  for  the  calculation  of  heteroskedasticity-robust  standard  errors 
that are invariant to the form of the skedastic  function. 
When there is heteroskedasticity,  the standard deviation  of the distur- 
bance in the growth  equation  varies systematically  across countries.  Ed- 
wards's  decision  to  weight  his  observations  by  the  level  of  GDP  per 
capita implies  an assumption  that the standard  deviation  of the  distur- 
bances  in  the  growth  equation  is inversely  proportional  to the  square 
root of the level  of GDP per capita in 1985. In other words,  if the United 
States is-as  it in effect was  in 1985 according  to the Summers-Heston 
data-59  times  wealthier  than  Ethiopia,  the  standard  deviation  of the 
growth rate conditional  on having  the United States's income is 7.7 (591/2) 
times  lower  than  conditional  on  having  Ethiopia's  income.  Using  the 
estimates  of  the  residuals'  standard  deviation  from  one  of  Edwards's 
equations,  we  can  calculate  the  implied  root-mean-square  error of the 
growth  rate conditional  on having  the incomes  of the United  States and 
of Ethiopia.  The former is 0.8 percentage  points,  whereas  the latter is 6 
percentage  points.  It may be reasonable  to suppose  that growth  data for 
poor  countries  are less  reliable  than  those  for  rich countries,  but  the 
errors implied  by Edwards's  weighting  assumption  for poor  countries' 
growth  data seem to us to be unreasonably  high.  As a matter of fact, it is 
hard to think of a reason to be doing  regression  analysis  on a broad cross 
section  of  primarily  poor  countries  if we  believe  that underdeveloped 
nations'  economic  data are this uninformative. 
Columns  3 and  4 of Table 5 repeat  Edwards's  regressions  using  the 
natural log of 1985 per capita GDP as the weighting  variable. In terms of 
our calculations  above,  the ratio between  the  U.S.  and  Ethiopian  stan- 
dard deviations  would  now be a more reasonable  1.31. This set of regres- 
sions  results in six of the eighteen  coefficients  having  the "wrong" sign. 
Five out  of nine  coefficients  are significant  among  the least-squares  re- 
gressions  (four at 5%), and two out of nine in the instrumental  variables 
(IV) regressions.  The  coefficient  on  the  principal-components  variable 
now  becomes  insignificant.33 
33. Why does  weighting  by GDP give  such  different  results? The reason  seems  to be that 
there is a relationship  between  the openness  indices  used by Edwards and TFP growth 
at high  levels  of income.  This relationship  in itself is apparently  driven by the fact that 
the great majority of economies  with  restrictive trade practices and high levels  of GDP 
per capita in 1985 were  oil exporters.  Because  of their high  incomes,  these  economies 
are weighted  very heavily  in the WLS regressions.  It is well  known  that oil-exporting 
economies  had very low  rates of growth  during  the 1980s (see for example  the studies 
in Gelb, 1988). If one redoes regressions  1-19  using  GDP per capita weights  but includ- Trade  Policy  and  Economic  Growth  ?  297 
One way  to put aside  doubts  about the appropriateness  of alternative 
assumptions  regarding  the  nature  of  the  skedastic  function  is  to  use 
White's  (1980)  heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors,  which 
are robust to the form of heteroskedasticity.  We show  these  estimates  in 
column 5 and 6 of Table 5. Four out of nine coefficients  are now significant 
among  the least-squares  regressions  (three at 5%), and two  out of nine 
among  the IV regressions.  Only twelve  of the eighteen  coefficients  have 
the correct sign.  The principal components  variable is also insignificant. 
5.2 THE  PROBLEM  WITH  IDENTIFICATION 
The two significant IV coefficients  in Table 5 are moreover  quite sensitive 
to the specification  of the instrument  lists.  In particular, the IV versions 
of equations  2 and  7 in Table 5 are two  of the  only  three  equations  in 
which  the  Heritage  Foundation  Index  of Property  Rights  Protection  is 
used  as an instrument  by Edwards.34 If this instrument  is not excludable 
from the second-stage  regression,  Edwards's  IV estimation  will give bi- 
ased estimates  of the coefficient  of openness  on growth.  Theoretically, it 
seems  to us unreasonable  to assert that the protection  of property rights 
can  effectively  be  assumed  not  to  be  an  important  determinant  of 
growth,  given  the extensive  literature concerned  precisely  with  such  an 
effect.35 In Table 6,  columns  1-4,  we  show  that,  if property  rights  are 
included  in  the  second-stage  regression  for  these  two  equations,  this 
term  gets  a  significant  coefficient  in  indicator  2  (World Development 
Report index)  and a positive  albeit insignificant  coefficient in indicator 7 
(Heritage  Foundation  index).  Chi-squared  tests  of  the  overidentifying 
restrictions also reject the null hypothesis  that these restrictions hold for 
indicator 2. Furthermore,  in both  indicators  the  t-statistic on  the open- 
ness  proxy falls to well below  0.5 in absolute value. 
If we  take  seriously  the  fact that property  rights  are not  excludable 
from the  productivity  growth  regressions,  we  are left with  the  conclu- 
sion  that,  among  17 different  specifications  in Tables 5 and  6, we  find 
ing  a dummy  for oil exporters,  one  gets  very  similar results  to those  in column  3 of 
Tables 5 and  6.  Only  the  coefficients  for the  World Development  Report  index,  the 
Heritage  Foundation  index,  and the least-squares  estimate  of the collected-taxes  ratio 
remain significant,  and the least-squares  coefficient  on quotas changes  sign. 
34. His other instruments  include  TFP growth in the 1970s and the black-market premium, 
export/GDP, import/GDP and terms-of-trade  changes  for 1975-1979. 
35. Barro (1997) names  "the importance  of institutions  that ensure property  rights and free 
markets" for economic  growth  as one of the "dominant  themes"  of his recent research 
(p. xiv). For examples  of the literature emphasizing  the importance  of property  rights 
for economic  growth,  see  Clague  et al. (1996), Acheson  and McFetridge  (1996), Jodha 
(1996), Tornell (1997), Park and Ginarte (1997), Grossman  and Kim (1996), and Thomp- 
son  and Rushing  (1996). Table 6  SENSITIVITY  TO IDENTIFICATION ASSUMPTIONS  AND  CHOICE OF TRADE TAX INDICATOR 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)'  (8) 
World Development  Report index  0.0126**  0.0023 
(2.13)  (0.40) 
Heritage Foundation  index  -0.0202*  -0.003 
(-3.24)  (-0.24) 
Property rights  -0.0107*  -0.010 
(-2.91)  (-1.43) 
Collected-taxes  ratio (Edwards)  -0.2676 
(-2.25)** 
Average  duty  (World Bank)  0.0225 
(1.01) 
Average import duty  (World Bank)  0.0007  0.0003 
(2.30)**  (0.884) 
Average export duty (World Bank)  -0.0003 
(-1.09) 
Test of overidentifying  restrictions  29.3244  5.4072 
p-value  6.72E-06  0.2480 
N  30  30  56  56  45  43  43  66 
Dependent variable:  TFP  Growth, 1980-1990. Each equation also includes log GDP per capita in 1965 and schooling in 1965 as regressors. t-statistics  based on 
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evidence  of  a negative  and  statistically  significant  correlation  between 
trade-restricting  policies  and  productivity  growth  in  only  three  cases. 
Those are the ones  that use the collected-taxes  ratio, the World Develop- 
ment Report index,  or the Heritage  Foundation  index.  We take up some 
problems  with  these  indexes  in the next subsection. 
5.3 DATA  ISSUES 
Edwards reports that the collected-taxes  ratio (which measures  trade tax 
revenue  as a proportion  of total trade) is calculated  from raw data pro- 
vided  by  the  IME We are puzzled  by  these  data,  because  many  of the 
numbers  for developing  countries  are implausible.  India, a country with 
one of the world's  highest  tariff rates, is listed as having  an average ratio 
of 2.4% lower  than  the  sample  average  and barely  above  the value  for 
Chile (2.3%). The mean value of the collected-taxes  ratio in the sample is 
2.8%, which  strikes us as very low. 
We have  attempted  to replicate Edwards's  results using  data from the 
World Bank's World Development  Indicators  (1998). This source,  which 
was  not  available  at the  time  Edwards's  analysis  was  first conducted, 
provides  collected  trade  tax ratios  for imports  and  exports  separately, 
which  we  have  combined  to derive  an index  in the  spirit of Edwards's 
variable.36 According  to this index,  India's average  trade tax is 37.3% (a 
more plausible  figure than Edwards's  2.4%). We replicate equation  8 of 
Table 5 with  these  data,  and  the  results  are shown  in columns  6-8  of 
Table 6. The coefficient  on  average  duties  is now  insignificant  and has 
the  "wrong" sign  (column  6). If we  introduce  import and export duties 
separately  (column  7),  then  import  duties  in  fact  get  a  positive  and 
significant coefficient  (contrary to the expected  negative  coefficient),  and 
export duties  are insignificant. 
One  shortcoming  of these  specifications  (including  Edwards's)  is the 
small  sample  size  (between  43 and  45).  Since  export  duties  are not  re- 
ported  for many  countries,  one  way  of increasing  the sample  size  is to 
introduce  only the  import-duty  variable  from  the  World Development 
Indicators database.  This increases  the sample  size  to 66 countries.  The 
estimated  coefficient on import duties is once again positive  and insignifi- 
cant (column  8). 
These results  are in line with  others we have  reported  earlier: there is 
36. As our earlier discussion showed, when imports and exports are both taxed, their 
distortionary effect is  multiplicative rather than additive. So instead of summing 
import and export taxes, we use the formula  (1 + mdut)(1 + xdut) -  1, where mdut 
(xdut) is import (export) duties as a percentage of imports (exports). We take the 
average of observations  for 1980-1985. Our results (on the sign and insignificance  of 
the coefficient  on trade  taxes) are unchanged, however, when we take the simple sum 
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little evidence  that simple  averages  of trade taxes  are significantly  and 
negatively  correlated with  growth. 
The other two variables  that are significant  are the subjective  indexes 
constructed  by the World Bank and the Heritage Foundation.  It is strik- 
ing that two  subjective  indexes  are the only  variables  that are robust to 
our  econometric  analysis,  since  subjective  indexes  are well  known  to 
suffer from judgment  biases.  Indeed,  a look at the  two  indexes  reveals 
some  striking contrasts.  In the Heritage Foundation  Index,  for example, 
Chile and Uganda  are in the same category (4 on a scale of 1 to 5, where 5 
is most  protected).  Perhaps  even  more  problematic  is the  fact that the 
Heritage  Foundation  index  rates policies  in  1996, well  after the  end  of 
Edwards's  sample  period  (1980-1990).  Similar problems  are present  in 
the World Bank index,  where  high-growth  Korea is rated as more open 
than  moderate-growth  Malaysia  despite  having  higher  tariff rates  and 
nontariff-barrier  coverage  as  well  as  a  lower  export/GDP  ratio,  and 
moderate-growth  Tunisia-which  had  average  tariffs of 21% and  aver- 
age nontariff coverage  of 54%-is  classified  in the same group  as Chile, 
Malaysia,  and  Thailand.  In fact, in his  1993 literature review,  Edwards 
(1993, pp.  1386-1387)  himself  drew  attention  to serious  problems  with 
this  index.  As  he  noted,  Chile,  which  in other  studies  is rated  as  the 
most  open  economy  in the  developing  world,  was  grouped  in the  sec- 
ond category  (moderately  outward-oriented);  Korea was classified  in the 
group  of most  open  economies  for both  1963-1973  and  1973-1985  de- 
spite  the  fact  that  in  the  former  period  the  Korean  trade  regime  was 
considerably  more restrictive than in the latter. 
In the  working-paper  version  of  this  paper  we  report  the  results  of 
recomputing  these  subjective  indexes  using  the quantitative  information 
on which  they  are purportedly  based.  Given  that these  underlying  data 
are no different from those used  in some of the other empirical work that 
we have discussed  in this and other sections  of the paper, it should  come 
as no surprise  that these  attempts  generally  yielded  insignificant  coeffi- 
cients.  The  natural  conclusion  from  these  results  appears  to  be  that 
either the mismatch  in time periods  or subjectivity biases  or both are the 
fundamental  causes  for the significance  of the Heritage  Foundation  and 
World Bank indexes. 
In sum,  we  do  not  concur  with  Edwards's  assertion  that  the  cross- 
country data reveal the existence  of a robust relationship  between  open- 
ness  and  productivity  or GDP growth.37 In our view,  there  is little evi- 
37. Our results  are basically  unaltered  if we  use  growth  of GDP per capita from  1980 to 
1990 instead  of TFP growth  as the dependent  variable. In this case the World Bank and 
Heritage  Foundation  indexes  remain  significant,  but the  collected-trade-taxes  ratio is 
now  only  significant  at a 10% level  and  the  black-market  premium  is  insignificant. 
Similar results emerge  for IV estimation. Trade  Policy  and  Economic  Growth  ?  301 
dence  to support  such  an assertion.  The results  reviewed  in this section 
are for the most  part highly  dependent  on questionable  weighting  and 
identification  assumptions.  The  trade-policy  indicators  whose  signifi- 
cance is not affected by these  assumptions  either are subjective  indexes 
apparently  highly  contaminated  by judgement  biases  or lack robustness 
to the  use  of more  credible  information  from alternative  data  sources. 
6. Dan Ben-David  (1993) 
Ben-David's  (1993) QJE  paper "Equalizing exchange: Trade liberalization 
and  income  convergence"  takes  an  altogether  different  approach  to 
studying  the  effect  of  openness  on  economic  growth.  Ben-David  ana- 
lyzes  the  effect  of  trade  policies  on  income  by  asking  whether  trade 
liberalization  leads  to  a  reduction  in  the  dispersion  of  income  levels 
among  liberalizing  countries  (i.e.,  whether  it contributes  to  what  has 
been  called  o-convergence).  We  pick  Ben-David  as  an  example  of  a 
strand  of  the  literature  which  has  centered  on  studying  the  effect  of 
trade on convergence.  Another  distinctive  aspect of Ben-David's  work is 
that it is nonparametric  and not regression-based. 
The expectation  that trade liberalization  might lead to income  conver- 
gence is grounded  in the factor price equalization  (FPE)  theorem.  Accord- 
ing to trade theory, free trade in goods  leads to the equalization  of factor 
prices under certain conditions  (including  an equal number of goods  and 
factors, identical technologies,  and absence  of transport costs).  As barri- 
ers  to  trade  are relaxed  (and  assuming  in  addition  that  differences  in 
capital-labor  ratios  and  labor-force  participation  ratios  do  not  coun- 
tervail),  a tendency  towards  FPE can be  set  into  motion,  resulting  in 
convergence  in per capita incomes. 
There is no necessary  relationship  between  the level  of dispersion  in 
incomes  and the growth rate. Countries could in principle be converging 
to  lower  levels  of  GDP  per  capita.  But  in  the  case  of  the  European 
Community,  on which  Ben-David  concentrates,  the convergence  experi- 
enced  was  indeed  to higher  incomes.  Overall growth  from 1945 to 1994 
of the EC5 (Belgium,  France, the Netherlands,  Italy, and Germany) was 
3.45% compared  to  1.21% percent  from  1900 to  1939 and  1.16% from 
1870 to 1899. Therefore, if Ben-David's  claim is right, convergence  in the 
EEC was achieved  by raising the income of poor countries rather than by 
lowering  that of rich countries. 
Ben-David's  argument  goes  beyond  simply  ascertaining  that  a  de- 
crease in dispersion  occurred  during  the postwar  era. He tries to show 
that trade liberalization  caused  this decrease by discarding  other plausi- 
ble alternatives.  Thus he  argues  (1) that the observed  convergence  was 302 *  RODRIGUEZ  & RODRIK 
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not simply  a continuation  of a long-term  convergence  trend unrelated  to 
postwar  economic  integration; (2) that the European countries that chose 
not to enter a free-trade agreement  did not experience  the same extent of 
convergence  as the EEC; and  (3) that other subsets  of economies  in the 
world  that were  not economically  integrated  did not experience  conver- 
gence.  We examine  each of his arguments  in turn. 
6.1 WAS  EUROPEAN  CONVERGENCE  A CONTINUATION  OF A 
LONG-TERM  TREND? 
In support  of  the  argument  that  the  reduction  in  dispersion  was  not 
simply  the continuation  of a long-run  trend,  Ben-David  argues  that the 
series  of  per  capita  income  dispersion  (solid  line  in  Figure  3)  does 
not show  any visible downward  tendency  before the postwar  era. When 
presenting  this  series,  Ben-David  excludes  Germany  from  the  calcula- 
tions,38 arguing  that not  doing  so would  bias the conclusion  in favor of 
convergence: 
Germany was  always among the poorest, in per capita terms, of the six 
countries. Today,  it is one of the wealthiest countries  in Europe. As a result of 
its heightened prosperity,  it might be claimed that all of the convergence that 
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has been witnessed within the EEC  is due to the behavior  of Germany.  Thus, 
its exclusion should bias the results away from convergence. (Ben-David, 
1993,  p. 662) 
Note  however  that the  purpose  of Figure 3 (Figure VII in Ben-David's 
paper)  is  not  only  to  establish  the  existence  of  convergence  following 
postwar  liberalization,  but  also  to  establish  the  absence of  a long-term 
trend in convergence  predating  it. Thus the exclusion  of Germany from 
the  series,  which  biases  the  results  against  convergence,  would  also 
bias  the  results  in  favor  of  the  hypothesis  that  there  was  no  prewar 
convergence  trend,  had  Germany's  convergence  occurred  before  the 
postwar  period. 
That is indeed  what  happened.  Between  1870 and  the  eve  of World 
War II, Germany's  income  went  from less  than 50% to 75% of the aver- 
age for the remaining  members  of the EEC. And by 1958, one year after 
the EEC was  formed,  Germany  had surpassed  Belgium  as the leader of 
the  five.  The  exclusion  of  Germany  therefore  has  the  effect  of  under- 
stating  the fall in dispersion  before the creation of the EEC. The dashed 
line in Figure 7, which  displays  the dispersion  of log per capita incomes 
including  Germany, shows  this.  Once  Germany is included  in the sam- 
ple, it appears that dispersion  has been on a downward  trend since 1870. 
The hypothesis  that postwar  convergence  was simply a continuation  of a 
long-term  trend can no longer be rejected easily, raising doubts about the 
conclusion  that convergence  was  caused  by postwar  trade policies.39 
Figure 4 plots  the  standard  deviation  of log  incomes  for the  original 
members  of  the  EEC, now  using  Maddison's  more  recent  (1995) esti- 
mates  and including  Germany. We reach the same conclusion  as in Fig- 
ure 3: dispersion  has followed  a downward  trend since the beginning  of 
the twentieth  century. From a peak of 0.36 in 1897, dispersion  had fallen 
to 0.25 in 1930, and 0.19 in 1939. By the time the EEC was created, it had 
fallen  to 0.16.  It appears  therefore  that the  further reduction  in disper- 
39. Ben-David (in personal communication)  has pointed out to us  that much of the 
prewar convergence is due to the fact that "while the other countries were in the 
Depression, Germany  surged ahead as Hitler  built his war machine."  Indeed, disper- 
sion appears  trendless  from 1900  to 1932,  and starts falling only as Germany's  income 
rises during the National  Socialist  period. But we are not sure of what to make of that 
fact. Germany's  income remained high after the war-compared  to other European 
countries-suggesting  that not all of the convergence  was due to the policies of the 
Nazi period or to the buildup of the war machine. In any case, Nazi Germany 
pursued highly protectionist  policies, so that its experience  sheds doubt on the argu- 
ment that poor countries that close their economies experience slower growth. Fi- 
nally, the observation  for 1870 in Figure 7 suggests that dispersion was much higher 
in the late nineteenth century than in 1930. The last point is confirmed when we 
examine Maddison's (1995) more recent estimates (see Figure 8), which provide a 
fuller picture of trends in dispersion since 1820.  These estimates were not available  to 
Ben-David  at the time his paper  was written. 304 *  RODRIGUEZ  & RODRIK 
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sion that followed  the creation of the EEC (to 0.06 by 1994) was a contin- 
uation  of a long-term  trend  that predated  European  integration.  More- 
over, this conclusion  is not sensitive  to whether  Germany  is included  in 
the sample: that is because  Maddison's  (1995) revised  estimates  suggest 
that there was  a uniform  pattern  of convergence  during  the pre-World 
War I period,  with  Italy,  France,  and  Germany  all catching  up  with 
Belgium and the Netherlands. 
A closer look at Figure 4 suggests  that there is in fact very little associa- 
tion between  episodes  of economic  integration  and  a-convergence  over 
time.  The  period  leading  up  to  1878 was  an  era of  continuous  trade 
liberalization,  at  the  level  of  both  national  markets  and  international 
ones.  This period  witnessed  the creation of the German Zollverein (1833) 
and  the  unification  of  Italy (1860),  as well  as  the  signing  of free-trade 
agreements  between  Prussia  and  Belgium  (1844), France and  Belgium 
(1842), France and  Prussia  (1862), France and  Italy (1863), and  France 
and  the  Netherlands  (1865).40 Most  of  these  bilateral  agreements  had 
40. The discussion  in this and the following  two paragraphs borrows heavily  from Chapter 
V of Pollard (1974). Above  we  list treaties between  countries  included  in Figure 4, but 
the extent  of trade liberalization  from 1820 to 1878 in Europe was  impressive.  Prussia 
signed  free-trade  treaties  with  Britain (1841 and  1860), Turkey (1839), Greece  (1840), 
Austria  (1868),  Spain  (1868),  Switzerland  (1869),  Mexico  (1869),  and  Japan  (1869); 
France with  Britain (1860), Switzerland  (1864), Sweden,  Norway,  the  Hanse  Towns, 
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most-favored-nation  clauses,  extending  the benefits  of bilateral  liberaliza- 
tion  to  third  countries.  Yet,  despite  increasing  economic  integration, 
dispersion  more  than  doubled  from  1820  to  1880  (from  0.14  to  0.29).41 
The  retreat  from  free  trade  started  during  the  1880s,  with  Germany's 
Tariff Act  of  1879.  Italy  raised  tariffs  in  1878  and  1887,  France  in  1881  and 
1892.42 This  rise  in  protection  followed  the  depression  of  the  1870s  and 
was  motivated  by  the  desire  to protect  European  farmers  from  the  influx 
of cheap  American  grain  imports  (which  began  to undersell  German  grain 
in  1875)  while  at the  same  time  compensating  industry  for the  increased 
wages  of workers.43  Nevertheless,  as Figure  4 shows,  the  period  from  the 
1880s  to World  War I was,  if anything,  one  of convergence.44 
The  breakdown  in  world  trade  that  followed  World  War  I  and  the 
spread  of beggar-thy-neighbor  protectionist  policies  adopted  during  the 
Great  Depression  seem  also  to  have  had  very  little  effect  on  dispersion. 
Even  though  fascist  governments  in  Italy  and  Germany  raised  agricul- 
tural  tariffs  and  other  protectionist  barriers,  and  in  France  the  power  of 
agricultural  groups  was  large  enough  to  drive  the  French  price  of wheat 
in  1939  to  three  times  its  price  in  London  (Cobban,  1965,  p.  156),  on  the 
eve  of  World  War II dispersion  stood  at its  lowest  level  since  the  1860s. 
In  sum,  Figure  4 shows  no  long-run  tendency  for  trade  liberalization 
to be  associated  with  greater  convergence  in  per  capita  incomes.  If any- 
thing,  it shows  increasing  dispersion  during  the  nineteenth  century  and 
falling  dispersion  during  the  twentieth  century.  While  one  can  interpret 
this  evidence  in  different  ways,  we  find  the  most  straightforward  read- 
and Spain (1865), Austria  (1866), and Portugal (1867); Belgium with Britain (1862); Italy 
with  Britain (1862) and Turkey and  Greece  (1839-1940).  Aside  from the  MFN clause, 
measures  were  taken to ease international  trade such as the inclusion  in the Treaties of 
Berlin of clauses  extending  commercial  freedoms  to foreign citizens  (1878, 1885). There 
were  even  attempts  to create  customs  unions  between  France and Germany  and be- 
tween  France and its neighbors. 
41. A caveat applies here: for 1820-1850  we rely on just two observations:  one for 1820, and 
another  one  for 1850. Since  the  1850 observation  for Italy was  not  available,  we  con- 
structed it as the result of a linear interpolation  between  the 1820 and the 1870 observa- 
tion.  Even  if we  disregard  the  evidence  before  1870, the  yearly  data from  1870-1880 
indicate  that the increase in dispersion  predated  the first protectionist  measures. 
42. Again,  tariff adoption  was  widespread,  with  only  Holland  and the  United  Kingdom 
resisting  the reversion  towards  protectionism. 
43. In effect,  high  tariffs worked  to the  detriment  of labor in what  came to be known  in 
Germany  as the  "compact  of rye  and  iron."  See  Gerschenkron  (1943) and  Rogowski 
(1989) for detailed discussions  of this era. As Rogowski  points out, the reversion towards 
protectionism  was  more accentuated  in capital-poor  countries  such  as Germany, Italy, 
and France than in capital-rich countries  such as Belgium and the Netherlands. 
44. O'Rourke's  (1997) econometric  study  of this period  (1975-1914),  covering  a panel of 10 
countries,  finds  that higher  tariffs were  correlated  with faster economic  growth,  and 
that the estimated  effects are quantitatively  large. 306 *  RODRIGUEZ  & RODRIK 
ing to be that post-World  War II convergence  was  in fact a continuation 
of  a long-run  trend  that  got  started  around  the  turn  of  the  twentieth 
century. 
6.2 DID NON-EEC  EUROPEAN  COUNTRIES 
EXPERIENCE  CONVERGENCE? 
Ben-David  also  claims  that countries  in Europe that did not  undertake 
trade  liberalization  failed  to  experience  convergence.  He  supports  his 
argument  by  showing  that  (a) there  was  no  convergence  among  the 
United  Kingdom,  Denmark,  and Ireland until they began  to relax their 
trade restrictions  vis-a-vis  Europe,  and  that (b) EFTA countries  experi- 
enced  significant  convergence  with  the  EEC as  trade  barriers  among 
them were  liberalized. 
To demonstrate  (a), Ben-David plots the standard deviation  among the 
United Kingdom,  Denmark,  and Ireland, all of which  started liberalizing 
trade  with  the  EEC in  the  mid-1960s.  He  shows  that  their  dispersion 
among themselves  started falling  only  after 1965. It is not clear to us why 
this  is  the  relevant  test,  since  the  trade  liberalization  in  question  took 
place  between  these  countries  and  Europe  as  well  as  amongst  them- 
selves.  In Figure 5, we show  that even  if there is an indication  of conver- 
gence  among  these  three countries  after 1965, it is not caused by conver- 
Figure  5 GDP OF UNITED  KINGDOM,  DENMARK,  AND IRELAND, 
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gence  to  the  mean  income  of  EEC members.  Ireland has  shown  very 
little convergence  to the EEC until recent years,  and Denmark has oscil- 
lated close to the EEC average since the 1950s. The United  Kingdom  has 
been  converging-downward-to  the EEC level  steadily  (at least) since 
the 1950s. None  of the three countries  seem  to experience  different pat- 
terns of convergence  after they relaxed trade restrictions with the EEC in 
1965. 
As regards (b), there has indeed  been substantial  convergence  by EEC 
and EFTA member  countries  to the European mean  since the 1950s. But 
we  are skeptical  whether  such  convergence  can be  attributed  to trade 
liberalization. In Figure 6, we plot the contribution to the variance around 
the European mean45  of three subsets of European countries: the six mem- 
bers of the European  Economic  Community,  the  seven  members  of the 
European  Free Trade Association,46 and  six remaining  European  coun- 
tries  which  did  not  join  either  EFTA or the  EEC.47  It is  evident  from 
45. This is defined  as (1/NEuROPE)  ZiEJ [(Yi  -  YEUROPE)/YEUROPE]2  for J = {EEC6, EFTA6, others}. 
Normalization  by the mean achieves the same purpose as calculating  the variance  of 
log incomes (and is more appropriate  for large income differences),  and putting the 
expression  in terms of the variance  (not the standard  deviation)  ensures that the three 
components sum to the total. 
46. Austria,  Switzerland,  Sweden, Denmark,  Norway,  Finland,  and the United Kingdom. 
Even though Portugal  was officially  a member  of EFTA,  it was allowed to implement 
tariffs  and to deviate from  EFTA  policies, so we follow Ben-David  in treating  it as a non- 
EFTA  country. 
47. Cyprus, Greece,  Iceland,  Ireland,  Portugal,  and Spain. 308 *  RODRIGUEZ  & RODRIK 
Figure  6 that all subgroups  have  experienced  substantial  convergence. 
The non-EFTA and non-EEC countries have seen their contribution to the 
variance around the European mean fall from 0.085 to 0.034 from 1950 to 
1992.48 European  convergence  seems  to be  the  result  of factors largely 
unrelated  to trade liberalization. 
6.3 DID OTHER  AREAS  OF THE  WORLD 
EXPERIENCE  CONVERGENCE? 
To add plausibility  to the  story that trade liberalization  was  behind  the 
European  trend  towards  convergence  in  the  postwar  era,  Ben-David 
shows  that subsets  of countries  that have  not become  integrated  have 
experienced  no tendency  to converge.  He points  to the well-known  fact 
that the  dispersion  of world  incomes  has  not  decreased  in the postwar 
era  (it  has  actually  increased).  He  also  shows  that  the  dispersion  of 
incomes  among  the  world's  25 richest  countries  (excluding  the  EEC6) 
has  not  decreased  either.  He compares  these  experiences  with  those  of 
economically  integrated  Europe  and  U.S.  states  to  show  that  conver- 
gence  seems  to occur only when  there is substantial  trade liberalization. 
There is an asymmetry  in his  selection  of diverging  and  converging 
areas, however.  Whereas  the regions  he  shows  to be converging  are all 
close  to each other geographically,  those  which  are diverging  are not. To 
have a fair standard of comparison,  one must ask whether trade liberaliza- 
tion-or  its absence-among  geographically  adjacent economies  would 
lead towards  convergence  or divergence. 
Did subsets  of geographically  adjacent economies  that liberalized trade 
tend  to observe  convergence?  There are at least two  important  cases  in 
which  the trends in convergence  go counter to what we would  expect on 
the basis of Ben-David's  argument.  Consider the experiences  of East Asia 
and Latin America, two regions with radically different trade policies and 
which constitute  the canonical examples  of open and closed economies.  If 
the  liberalizatoin-convergence  view  is  right,  the  relatively  open  East 
Asian  economies  should  have  converged,  whereas  the relatively  closed 
Latin American  economies  should  have  diverged.  In fact,  countries  in 
East Asia have steadily diverged  since the 1960s, with the standard devia- 
tion of their log incomes  going  from 0.47 in 1960 to 0.81 in 1989.49  As for 
48. If one includes Turkey  as a seventh country in this group, the contribution  to disper- 
sion goes from 0.103 in 1950 to 0.053 in 1992. An alternative  measure of dispersion 
around the European  mean is the standard  deviation of log incomes around  the mean 
log income. The latter  measure  for the non-EEC,  non-EFTA  countries  falls from  0.15 in 
1950  to 0.05 in 1990  (0.20 to 0.10 if Turkey  is included). 
49. The East Asian countries are Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan,  South Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. Data are from Summers and Heston 
(1994).  If the Philippines  is excluded, the rise in dispersion  is from 0.50 to 0.73. Trade  Policy and Economic  Growth *  309 
Latin  America,  there  has  been  a steady  decrease in  dispersion  during  the 
period  of  import  substitution,  from  0.55  before  the  Great  Depression  to 
0.20  in  the  late  1980s.50 More  striking,  dispersion  has  sharply  risen  since 
the  late 1980s,  just  as Latin American  countries  liberalized  their trade.  (See 
Rodriguez  and  Rodrik,  1999,  for more  details.) 
Another  important  counterexample  comes  from  the  historical  experi- 
ence  of the  United  States.  Figure  7 plots  the  ratio  of GDP  per capita  for the 
United  States  to  the  average  GDP  per  capita  for its  three  main  European 
trading  partners  (the  United  Kingdom,  France,  and  Germany)  up  to 
1938.51  Trade  with  Europe  was  approximately  two-thirds  of  total  U.S. 
trade  during  the  nineteenth  century,52  and  the  bulk  of that was  with  those 
three  countries.  It is however  evident  from  Figure  7 that  despite  declining 
levels  of  import  duties,  the  United  States  and  Europe  steadily  diverged 
between  1820 and  1938.  Again,  there  seems  to be  no  evident  relationship 
between  trade  liberalization  and  income  convergence.53 
We close  by  drawing  attention  to Slaughter's  (2000)  recent  examination 
of the  same  issue.  Slaughter  undertakes  a systematic  analysis  by compar- 
50. The  Latin American  countries  are Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Mexico,  and 
Peru.  Data are from Maddison  (1995), Summers  and Heston  (1994), and World Bank 
(1998). Latin American  import  substitution  policies  started  rather spontaneously  as a 
response  to  the  collapse  of  world-wide  demand  for raw  materials  in  1929 and  the 
adoption  of protectionist  measures  by the United  States and Britain in 1930 and  1931. 
Most countries abandoned  convertibility  and imposed  trade barriers during this period 
and did not liberalize until recent years  (see Diaz-Alejandro,  1981). 
51. The cutoff date of 1938 is chosen  because  during World War II the Americas  overtook 
Europe as the main destination  for U.S.  exports.  The Americas overtook  Europe as the 
main source of imports much earlier, during World War I. Including  observations  after 
1940 would  not change our results: the GDP per capita in 1994 for the United States was 
still 27% higher  than that of its three main European trading partners,  despite  the fact 
that after 1944 tariff rates stayed well into the single digits (Bureau of the Census,  1989). 
Choosing  the Americas instead of Europe as a standard of comparison would strengthen 
our results,  as the  divergence  between  U.S.  and  Latin American  incomes  during  the 
nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries  has  been  extremely  high  (see  Haber,  1997), and 
Canada represents  only about half of U.S.  trade with  the Americas. 
52. Before World War II, exports  to Europe  were  43% of total exports  and  imports  from 
Europe were 29% of total imports  (Bureau of the Census,  1989). 
53. Our broader conclusion  is not necessarily  inconsistent  with  Ben-David's  own  reading 
of the evidence.  Ben-David  (in personal  communication)  writes  that the main conclu- 
sions  that can be  drawn  from his  research are that "trade liberalization  is associated 
with income  convergence  only when  (a) the liberalization is comprehensive  and (b) the 
liberalization  occurs  between  countries  that  trade  extensively  with  each  other,"  and 
that "there is no  evidence  that these  outcomes  hold  for poor  countries."  In fact, Ben- 
David  (1999) has argued that trade flows  will be of little use in transferring knowledge 
to countries  with low levels  of human  capital. This contrasts strongly  with much of the 
discussion  in  the  literature,  which  has  interpreted  Ben-David  as  making  the  much 
stronger  claim  that  liberalization  leads  developing  countries  to  converge  with  their 
richer trading partners. A few examples  are IMF (1997, p. 84), World Bank (1996, p. 32), 
Vamvakidis (1996, p. 251), and Richardson et al. (1997, p. 100), all of which  refer to Ben- 
David in discussions  about developing  economies. 310 *  RODRIGUEZ  & RODRIK 
Figure  7 RATIO  OF U.S. TO EUROPEAN  GDP AND IMPORT  DUTIES, 
1820-1938 
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trol  countries  before  and  after  liberalization.  As  he  emphasizes/  this 
ing convergene  patterns among  liberalizing countries  may have before and  afterverging 
prior to the  liberalization  with  th  e  onvergll). Hence  Slpattern  am  ong  randomly chosen  con-ts 
trol  countries  before  and  after  liberalization.  As  he  emphasizes,  this 
to a  diffemore  systnce-in-differences  approach  avoidsof  the  kind of exercise we have carried  outer 
diffconverence.  In fact, he reports that muoch  ofds  the evidence  suggestfas  of before-and-afterade 
comparisons  (nonliberalizing  countriesbtoo may exhibit the same pattern 
before and  after) or  of  comparing liberalizing countries with  non- 
liberalizing  ones  (the  liberalizing  countries  may  have  been  converging 
prior to the liberalization  as well).  Hence  Slaughter's  approach amounts 
to a more systematic  version  of the kind of exercise we have carried out 
above by way  of specific  illustrations  (but using  only  post-World War II 
data). Slaughter focuses  specifically  on four instances  of trade liberaliza- 
tion: formation  of  the  EEC, formation  of EFTA, liberalization  between 
EEC and EFTA, and Kennedy  Round tariff cuts under GATT. His conclu- 
sion  is that there is no  systematic  link between  trade liberalization  and 
convergence.  In fact, he reports that much of the evidence  suggests  trade 
liberalization  diverges  incomes  among  liberalizers.  This parallels our re- 
sults  above. 
7.  Jeffrey  Frankel and David Romer (1999) 
Frankel and Romer's (1999) very recent AER paper on trade and incomes 
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lyzes  the  relationship  between  trade  and  income  by  estimating  cross- 
country  regressions  of  income  per  capita  on  the  trade-GDP  ratio and 
two  measures  of country  size  (population  and land  area). The authors' 
aim is  to  address  the  problem  of  the  likely  endogeneity  of  trade with 
respect  to income.  So the trade share is instrumented  by first estimating 
a  gravity  equation,  where  bilateral  trade  flows  are regressed  on  geo- 
graphic  characteristics  (countries'  size,  their  distance  from  each  other, 
whether  they  share  a  common  border,  and  whether  they  are  land- 
locked).  The fitted  trade values  are then  aggregated  across  partners  to 
create  an  instrument  for the  actual  trade  share.  An  earlier version  of 
Frankel and  Romer's  paper  included  initial  income  among  the  regres- 
sors in the second-stage  equation,  so that the results could also be given 
a growth  interpretation.  The  main  finding  of  the  paper  is  that  the  IV 
estimate  of the effect  of trade on income  is if anything  greater than the 
OLS estimate. 
As we mentioned  in the introduction,  this paper is concerned  with the 
relationship  between  incomes  and  the  volume of  trade,  and  does  not 
have immediate  implications  for trade policy. The reason is that the impli- 
cations of geography-induced  differences  in trade, on the one hand,  and 
policy-induced  variations in trade, on the other, can be in principle quite 
different.  Selective  trade policies  work as much by altering the structure 
of trade as they  do by reducing  its volume.  To the  extent  that policy  is 
targeted  on market failures,  trade restrictions  can augment  incomes  (or 
growth  rates)  even  when  indiscriminate  barriers  in  the  form  of  geo- 
graphical  constraints  would  be  harmful.  Of  course,  to  the  extent  that 
selective  trade policies  are subject to rent seeking,  it is also possible  that 
geography-induced  variations  in  trade  underestimate  the  real  costs  of 
trade restrictions.  Ultimately, whether  on balance trade policies  are used 
towards  benign  ends  or malign ends  is an empirical question,  on which 
Frankel and Romer's paper is silent. 
With regard to the  role of trade flows  proper,  we  are concerned  that 
Frankel and Romer's geographically  constructed  trade share may not be 
a valid instrument.  The reason is that geography  is likely to be a determi- 
nant of income  through  a multitude  of channels,  of which trade is (possi- 
bly) only one.  Geography  affects public health  (and hence  the quality of 
human  capital) through  exposure  to various  diseases.  It influences  the 
quality  of institutions  through  the  historical  experience  of colonialism, 
migrations,  and wars.  It determines  the quantity  and quality  of natural 
endowments,  including  soil fertility, plant variety, and the abundance  of 
minerals.  The  geographically  determined  component  of  trade  may  be 
correlated with  all these  other factors,  imparting  an upward  bias to the 
IV estimate  unless  these  additional  channels  are explicitly  controlled  for 
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As  there  is a single  instrument  used  in Frankel and  Romer's  regres- 
sions,  conventional  exclusion-restriction  tests performed  conditional  on 
a subset  of the instruments  being  excludable  from the  second-stage  re- 
gression  cannot  be carried out.  To check whether  Frankel and  Romer's 
result can be attributed to nontrade  effects of geography,  we  simply  test 
whether  some  summary  statistics of the geographical  factors influencing 
trade  can  be  excluded  from  the  second-stage  regression.  We  rerun 
Frankel and Romer's income  regressions,  adding  three summary  indica- 
tors of geography:  (1) distance  from the equator (used in Hall and Jones, 
1998); (2) the  percentage  of a country's  land  area that is in the  tropics 
(from Radelet,  Sachs,  and Lee, 1997); and (3) a set of regional dummies. 
Table 7  shows  the  results.  Columns  1 and  5  replicate  Frankel  and 
Romer's (1999) results in their Table 3, for the OLS and IV versions  of the 
income  equation,  respectively.  The  other  columns  show  the  conse- 
quences  of introducing  the geography  variables.  The results  are highly 
Table  7  FRANKEL-ROMER  REGRESSIONS  WITH  ADDITIONAL 
GEOGRAPHICAL  VARIABLES 
Variable  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Trade  share  0.85  0.57  0.46  0.61  1.97  0.34  0.21  0.25 
(3.47)  (3.00)  (2.36)  (3.88) (1.99) (0.41)  (0.26)  (0.41) 
Disteq  3.58  3.65 
(9.26)  (7.98) 
Tropics  -1.42  -1.46 
(-9.84)  (-8.03) 
East Asia  -1.21  -1.21 
(-7.71)  (-7.59) 
Latin  America  -0.67  -0.74 
(-4.48)  (-3.83) 
Sub-Saharan  -1.94  -1.99 
Africa  (-14.72)  (-12.82) 
Method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV  IV  IV  IV 
n  150  150  145  150  150  150  145  150 
R2  0.0949 0.4312  0.4628  0.66  0.43  0.44  0.4563  0.65 
The dependent  variable is log of income  per person  in 1985. IV standard  errors include  adjustment  for 
generated  regressors.  All equations  include  the logs of population  and land area. Disteq is distance from 
equator,  as  measured  by  Hall  and  Jones  (1998).  Tropics  is  fraction  of  country's  area in  tropics,  as 
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suggestive.  The new  variables enter with  highly  significant  coefficients, 
indicating  that they belong  in the income  equation.  Moreover,  once  the 
additional  geography  variables  are included,  (1) the  IV coefficient  esti- 
mates on trade become  statistically insignificant  (with t-statistics around 
0.4 or below),  and (2) the IV point  estimates  on trade are reduced below 
their OLS counterparts.  These findings  are consistent  with  the hypothe- 
sis that nontrade  effects of geography  are the main driving force behind 
the findings  of Frankel and Romer.54 
8.  Other  Recent  Work 
Before we  close,  we  mention  briefly some  other recent papers  that have 
examined  the connection  between  openness  and economic  growth.  We 
focus  on  three  papers  in  particular: Lee  (1993),  Harrison  (1996),  and 
Wacziarg (1998). These papers  are of interest because  they contain  some 
methodological  innovations. 
Lee (1993) reasons,  on the basis of an analytical model,  that the distor- 
tionary effects of trade restrictions should  be larger in economies  that, in 
the absence of trade restrictions, would  be more exposed  to trade. Hence 
he interacts an indicator of trade policy  with  a measure  of what he calls 
"free trade openness"  (FREEOP).55  The latter is constructed  by regress- 
ing  observed  import  shares  on  land  area,  distance  from major trading 
partners,  import tariffs, and black-market premia,  and then  calculating 
the  predicted  value  of imports  when  the  actual values  of tariffs black- 
market premia are replaced by zeros.  He finds  that this composite  mea- 
sure (FREETAR)  enters a growth regression  with an estimated  coefficient 
that is negative  and statistically significant. 
Lee uses  two indicators of trade policy: an import-weighted  tariff aver- 
age and the black-market premium.  We have  discussed  above the short- 
comings  of the latter as a measure of trade policy (when  reviewing  Sachs 
and Warner, 1995). The problem  with  Lee's tariff variable, as Lee (1993, 
p. 320) acknowledges,  is that the underlying  tariff data are from "various 
years in the 1980s"-the  tail end of the 1960-1985  period over which  his 
growth  regressions  are run. This raises the possibility  of reverse  causa- 
tion:  countries  that  perform  well  tend  to  liberalize  their  trade  regime 
eventually.  To check for this possibility,  we  have  repeated  Lee's regres- 
sion,  using  the same specification  and tariff variable, but over the subse- 
54. We have carried out this exercise for various  other samples  [e.g.,  the higher-quality  98- 
country  sample  used  by  Frankel and  Romer  (1999), and  samples  excluding  possible 
outliers such as Luxembourg  and Hong  Kong] and reach identical conclusions. 
55. Specifically,  the  composite  measure  is  constructed  as  FREETAR =  FREEOP log(l  + 
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quent  time  period  1980-1994.56  While  the  estimated  coefficient  on 
FREETAR  is negative  for this later period,  it is nowhere  near significant 
(t-statistic  -0.80). 
Harrison's  (1996) main methodological  contribution  is to examine  the 
relationship  between  trade policy  and  growth  in a panel setting,  using 
fixed  effects  for countries.  This approach  has  the  advantage  that it en- 
ables the analyst to look for evidence  of the effects of trade liberalization 
within countries.57 But it has  the  disadvantage  that  the  available  time 
series are necessarily  short,  requiring the use of annual data or (at most) 
five-year  averages.  It may  be  a lot  to  ask of such  data to reveal  much 
about the relationship  between  trade policy  and growth,  because  of the 
likely lags involved  and the contamination  from business-cycle  effects.58 
Harrison uses  seven  indicators  of trade policy, and finds  that three of 
these  "exhibit a robust  relationship  with  GDP  growth"  (1996, p.  443). 
These  three are the following:  (1) the black-market premium,  (2) a mea- 
sure based  on the price level  of a country's  tradables (relative to interna- 
tional  prices),  and  (3) a subjective  measure  of  trade  liberalization  con- 
structed  at the  World Bank.  We have  already  discussed  at length  the 
problems  involved  in  interpreting  measures  of  each  of  these  types  as 
indicators of trade policy. 
Finally, the  paper  by Wacziarg (1998) is an ambitious  attempt  to un- 
cover  the  channels  through  which  openness  affects  economic  growth. 
Wacziarg's index  of trade policy  is a linear combination  of three indica- 
tors: (1) the average import duty rate, (2) the NTB coverage  ratio, and (3) 
the  SW indicator.59 The weights  used  to construct  the  combined  index 
come  from a regression  of trade volumes  (as a share of GDP) on  these 
three indicators  plus  some  other determinants.  Using  a panel  made  up 
of five-year  averages  for 57 countries  during  1970-1989,  Wacziarg finds 
that investment  is the most  important  channel  through  which  openness 
increases  growth,  accounting  for more than 60% of the total effect. 
We have  two  worries  about this paper.  First, we  are not sure that the 
56. Since Summers-Heston data are not available  for the 1990s,  we used World  Bank  data 
on GDP per capita (at constant  prices). 
57. Harrison  (1996)  cites disappointing  results with cross-section  regressions  as a motiva- 
tion for going the panel route. 
58. Indeed, when Harrison  (1996)  controls  for some business-cycle conditions, about half 
of her significant  coefficients  (on openness-related  variables)  disappear.  The empirical 
evidence on  the short-run  relationship between trade liberalization and economic 
growth is judiciously reviewed in Greenaway,  Morgan, and Wright  (1998),  who point 
to both positive and negative findings. These authors  attempt  to trace  out the dynamics 
of the output response using three different indicators  of policy (including the SW 
index), and report  finding a J-curve  effect:  output first  falls and then increases. 
59. More  specifically,  Wacziarg  uses the timing of trade  liberalization  in Sachs and Warer 
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regularities  revealed  by the data over time horizons  of five years or less 
are particularly informative  about the relationship  between  trade policy 
and long-run  economic  performance.  It would  be interesting  to see if the 
results  hold  up with  averages  constructed  over  a decade  or more.  Sec- 
ond,  as discussed  previously,  we  are skeptical  that the SW measure,  on 
which  the Wacziarg indicator is partly based,  is a meaningful  indicator of 
trade policy.  Wacziarg remarks in a footnote  (1998, footnote  9) that the 
"exclusion  of  [the  SW indicator]  from  the  trade  policy  index  reduced 
the  precision  of  the  estimates  ...  but  did  not  change  the  qualitative 
nature  of the results."  We would  have  preferred  to see  estimates  based 
only on tariff and NTB indicators. 
9.  Concluding  Remarks 
We have  scrutinized  in this paper  the most  prominent  recent empirical 
studies  on the relationship  between  trade barriers and economic  growth. 
While we  do not pretend  to have  undertaken  an exhaustive  survey,  we 
believe  that  the  weaknesses  we  have  identified  are  endemic  to  this 
literature. 
We emphasize  that our difficulty with  this literature is not a variant of 
the standard  robustness  criticism often  leveled  at cross-country  growth 
empirics.  Going  back at least  to Levine  and Renelt  (1992), a number  of 
authors have pointed  to the sensitivity  of growth  regressions  to changes 
in the list of controls,  and to the failure of these  coefficients  to pass  the 
test of "extreme-bounds  analysis."  Whatever  position  one  takes on this 
debate,  the  general  point  that  we  wish  to  make  about  the  empirical 
literature on openness  and growth  is much  simpler.  For the most  part, 
the  strong  results  in  this  literature  arise  either  from  obvious  mis- 
specification  or from the use of measures  of openness  that are proxies for 
other policy or institutional variables that have an independent  detrimen- 
tal effect on growth.  When we do point to the fragility of the coefficients, 
it is to make the point that the coefficients  on the openness  indicators are 
particularly sensitive  to controls  for these  other policy  and institutional 
variables.  To the  extent  that these  objections  can be  conceptualized  as 
variants of the robustness  criticism, it is robustness  at a much more basic 
level than that typically  discussed  in the Bayesian literature. 
Still,  in  view  of  the  voluminous  research  on  the  subject,  a natural 
question  that arises is whether  we  shouldn't  take comfort from the fact 
that  so  many  authors,  using  varying  methods,  have  all arrived  at the 
same  conclusion.  Don't  we  learn  something  from  the  cumulative  evi- 
dence,  even  if individual  papers have  shortcomings? 
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tive  relationship  between  trade restrictions  and economic  growth  been 
convincingly  demonstrated,  we  doubt  that this issue  would  continue  to 
generate  so much empirical research. We interpret the persistent  interest 
in this area as reflecting  the worry that the existing  approaches  haven't 
gotten  it quite right. One  indication  of this is that the newer  papers  are 
habitually motivated  by exegeses  on the methodological  shortcomings  of 
prior work. 
We are especially  struck and puzzled  by the proliferation of indexes  of 
trade  restrictions.  It is  common  to  assert  in  this  literature  that  simple 
trade-weighted  tariff averages  or nontariff  coverage  ratios-which  we 
believe  to be the most direct indicators of trade restrictions-are  mislead- 
ing as indicators  of the stance of trade policy. Yet we  know  of no papers 
that document  the existence  of serious  biases  in these  direct indicators, 
much  less  establish  that an alternative  indicator  performs better (in the 
relevant  sense  of calibrating  the  restrictiveness  of trade regimes).60 An 
examination  of simple  averages of taxes on imports and exports and NTB 
coverage  ratios leaves  us with the impression  that these  measures  in fact 
do  a decent  job of rank-ordering  countries  according  to the  restrictive- 
ness  of their trade regimes.  In the working-paper  version  of this paper, 
we  provide  a  simple  measure  of  import  duties  for  a large  sample  of 
countries  and three different periods,  so that the reader can form his/her 
judgement  on this (Rodriguez  and Rodrik, 1999, Table VIII.l).61 
As we  mentioned  in the introduction,  we  are skeptical  that there is a 
strong negative  relationship  in the data between  trade barriers and eco- 
nomic  growth,  at least  for levels  of trade restrictions  observed  in prac- 
tice.62  We view  the search for such a relationship  as futile. We think there 
are two other fruitful avenues  for future research. 
60. Pritchett  (1996) comes  closest.  The point  of his  paper,  however,  is  to  document  the 
weak  correlation between  commonly  used  indicators  of trade restrictions,  and not  to 
argue for the superiority  of one indicator over the others. 
61. This is the measure  of import tariffs we used  in Figure 1 (top panel). 
62. In his  comment  on this  paper,  Chad Jones acknowledges  the  fragility of many  of the 
results in the literature, but reports a range of exercises  that leads him to conclude,  as a 
best estimate,  that trade restrictions are harmful to long-run incomes  and that the effects 
are potentially  large.  We caution  the  reader  about  regressions  where  the  level of per 
capita  income  is  regressed  on  measures  of  trade  restrictions.  It is  well  known  that 
countries  reduce their trade barriers as they get richer, so levels  regressions  are subject 
to problems of reverse causality. It is difficult to overcome  this problem via instrumenta- 
tion,  since  adequate  instruments  (exogenous  variables  that  are correlated  with  trade 
restrictions,  but  are otherwise  uncorrelated  with  incomes)  are particularly difficult to 
find in this context (as our discussion  in Section 7 highlights).  When regressions  are run 
in growth  form, we find that none  of the available continuous  measures  of trade restric- 
tions  (simple  tariff averages  or nontariff coverage  ratios) enter significantly  in the vast 
majority of reasonable  specifications.  Some  dichotomous  measures  based  on the con- 
tinuous variables do somewhat  "better," but only if the break point is set at a sufficiently 
high  level  (e.g.,  a tariff rate or nontariff coverage  ratio in excess  of 40%). Trade  Policy  and  Economic  Growth  ?  317 
First, in cross-national  work,  it might be productive  to look for contin- 
gent relationships  between  trade policy and growth.  Do trade restrictions 
operate  differently  in low-  vs.  high-income  countries? In small vs.  large 
countries?  In countries  with  a comparative  advantage  in primary prod- 
ucts  vs.  those  with  comparative  advantage  in manufactured  goods?  In 
periods  of rapid expansion  of world  trade vs.  periods  of stagnant trade? 
Further, it would  help  to  disaggregate  policies  and  to  distinguish  the 
possibly  dissimilar effects of different types of trade policies  (or of combi- 
nations  thereof).  Are  tariff and  nontariff  barriers to  imports  of  capital 
goods  more  harmful  to  growth  than  other  types  of  trade  restrictions? 
Does  the provision  of duty-free  access  to imported  inputs  for exporters 
stimulate  growth?  Are export-processing  zones  good  for growth?  Does 
the  variation  in tariff rates  (or NTBs) across  sectors  matter? The cross- 
national work has yet to provide  answers  to such questions. 
Second,  we  think there is much  to be learned  from microeconometric 
analysis  of plant-level  datasets.  These  datasets  constitute  a rich source 
for uncovering  the ways in which trade policy influences  the production, 
employment,  and  technological  performance  of firms (see  Roberts and 
Tybout, 1996). Recent research by Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1998), Aw, 
Chung,  and  Roberts  (1998), and  Clerides,  Lach and  Tybout  (2000) has 
already shed  new  light on the relationship  between  trade and firm per- 
formance.  For example,  these papers  (based on the experiences  of coun- 
tries  as  diverse  as  the  United  States,  Taiwan,  and  Mexico)  find  little 
evidence  that firms derive technological  or other benefits from exporting 
per se; the more common  pattern is that efficient producers  tend to self- 
select  into  export  markets.  In other  words,  causality  seems  to go  from 
productivity  to exports,  not vice versa.  Relating these  analyses  to trade 
policies is the obvious  next step in this line of research. 
Let us close by restating our objective in this paper. We do not want to 
leave  the  reader with  the  impression  that we  think  trade protection  is 
good  for economic  growth.  We know  of no  credible  evidence-at  least 
for the post-1945 period-that  suggests  that trade restrictions are system- 
atically  associated  with  higher  growth  rates.  What  we  would  like  the 
reader  to  take  away  from  this  paper  is  some  caution  and  humility  in 
interpreting  the existing  cross-national  evidence  on the relationship  be- 
tween  trade policy  and economic  growth. 
The tendency  to greatly overstate  the systematic  evidence  in favor of 
trade  openness  has  had  a substantial  influence  on  policy  around  the 
world.  Our  concern  is  that  the  priority  afforded  to  trade  policy  has 
generated  expectations  that  are  unlikely  to  be  met,  and  it may  have 
crowded  out other institutional  reforms with potentially  greater payoffs. 
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scarce, having  a clear sense  of policy  priorities is of utmost  importance. 
The effects  of trade liberalization  may be on balance  beneficial  on stan- 
dard comparative-advantage  grounds;  the evidence  provides  no  strong 
reason  to dispute  this.  What we  dispute  is the view,  increasingly  com- 
mon,  that integration  into the world  economy  is such  a potent  force for 
economic  growth  that  it  can  effectively  substitute  for  a  development 
strategy. 
Data  Appendix 
SECTION  1 
1.  Import duties  as a percentage  of imports.  Source: World Bank (1998). 
2.  Nontariff barriers. Source: Barro and Lee (1994). 
SECTION  3 
3.  bmpav:  average  black-market  premium.  Source: Sachs  and  Warner 
(1995). 
4.  rcoast: coastal  length  over  total  land  area.  Source:  Radelet,  Sachs, 
and Lee (1997). 
5.  tropics: dummy  for tropical  countries.  Source:  Radelet,  Sachs,  and 
Lee (1997). 
6.  Latin  America:  dummy  for  countries  in  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean. 
7.  SSA: dummy  for countries  in sub-Saharan Africa. 
8.  East Asia: dummy  for countries  in East Asia. 
9.  TAR: own-import-weighted  ratio of tariff revenues  to trade. Source: 
Barro and Lee (1994). 
10.  NTB:  own-import-weighted  nontariff  frequency  on  capital  goods 
and intermediates.  Source: Barro and Lee (1994). 
11.  DISTORTION: ratio of consumption  price level  to U.S.  price  level, 
measured  in  identical  currencies,  divided  by  the  fitted  value  of  a 
regression  on  GDP,  GDP  squared,  year  dummies,  and  continent 
dummies.  Source: Dollar (1992). 
12.  VARIABILITY:  Coefficient of variation of DISTORTION. Source: Dol- 
lar (1992). 
13.  Investment/GDP:  Source:  Summers  and  Heston  (1988) for Table 2. 
14.  Log initial income:  Source: Summers  and Heston  (1988) for Table 2. 
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16.  BMP: Dummy  variable equal to 1 if black-market premium  exceeds 
20% during  either the 1970s or the 1980s. Source: Sachs and Warner 
(1995). 
17.  BMP70, BMP80: Black-market premium  during  (respectively)  1970s 
and 1980s. Source: Sachs and Warner (1995). 
18.  MON:  Dummy  variable  equal  to  1 if the  country  had  a score  of 4 
(highest  score) on the Export Marketing Index in World Bank (1994). 
Source: Sachs and Warner (1995). 
19.  SOC: Dummy  variable  equal  to  1 if the  country  was  classified  as 
socialist  in Komai  (1992). Source: Sachs and Warner (1995). 
20.  TAR: own-import-weighted  ratio of tariff revenues  to trade. Source: 
Barro and Lee (1994). 
21.  NTB:  own-import-weighted  nontariff  frequency  on  capital  goods 
and intermediates.  Source: Barro and Lee (1994). 
22.  OPEN: Variable equal to 0 if the country had  BMP =  1, MON  =  1, 
SOC  =  1,  TAR >  0.4,  or NTB  >  0.4.  Source:  Sachs  and  Warner 
(1995). 
23.  BM, SQT, QT, etc.: Openness  indexes  constructed  using  subsets  of 
the  Sachs  and  Warner's information.  The  label  for each  index  de- 
notes  the  openness  indicators  used  to  construct  that  index:  M  = 
state monopoly  of main export,  S =  socialist  economic  system,  Q = 
nontariff barriers, T = tariffs, B = black-market premium.  For exam- 
ple,  SMQT is set to 0 if it is closed  according  to either of the criteria 
for S, M, Q, or T, and to 1 otherwise. 
24.  Inflation,  1975-1990.  Source: World Bank (1998). 
25.  Debt/exports,  1985. Source: World Bank (1998). 
26.  Change  in terms of trade. Source: Barro and Lee (1994). 
27.  War: dummy  for countries  that participated  in at least one  external 
war over the period  1960-1985.  Source: Barro and Lee (1994). 
28.  Quality  of  institutions:  Institutional  quality  index  from Knack and 
Keefer (1995). 
29.  Government  budget  surplus,  1970-1990.  Source: World Bank (1998). 
30.  Population  growth.  Source: World Bank (1998). 
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31.  Sachs-Warner:  Same as OPEN in Section 4. 
32.  World Development  Report: World Development  Report outward- 
orientation  index,  1973-1985.  Source: Edwards  (1998). 320 - RODRIGUEZ  & RODRIK 
33.  Leamer: Openness  index estimated by Learer  (1988) using residuals 
from disaggregated  trade-flow  regressions.  Source: Edwards  (1998). 
34.  Black-market premium:  same as BMP80 in Section 4. 
35.  Tariffs: Same as TAR in Section 4. 
36.  Quotas: Same as NTB in Section 4. 
37.  Heritage Foundation: Subjective index of the extent to which  govern- 
ment policies  distort trade, from Johnson and Sheehy  (1996). Source: 
Edwards  (1998). 
38.  Collected-trade-taxes  ratio: Average  for  1980-1985  of  ratio of  total 
revenues  on international  trade taxes to total trade. Source: Edwards 
(1998). 
39.  Wolf's  index  of  import  distortions:  A regression-based  index  from 
Wolf (1993). Source: Edwards  (1998). 
40.  Principal-components  factor: First principal  component  of  OPEN, 
black-market premium,  tariffs, quotas,  and Wolf's index.  The equa- 
tion used  to calculate it is 
COM  =  -0.469  x  OPEN  +  0.320  x  BLACK +  0.494  x  TARIFF + 
0.553  x  QR +  0.354  x  WOLE 
41.  Log  of  GDP  per  capita,  1985.  From Summers  and  Heston  (1994). 
Source: Edwards  (1998). 
42.  Property rights: Heritage Foundation index of property-rights protec- 
tion,  from Johnson and Sheehy  (1996). Source: Edwards  (1998). 
43.  Average  import  and export  duties  (World Bank): From World Bank 
(1998). Average duty is calculated as (1 + export duty)  x  (1 + import 
duty)  -  1. 
44.  Merged  duty  index:  Simple  average  of average  duty  (43) and  (38). 
45.  Trade distortion  index based on Lee's data. Analog  of Heritage index 
using  data  from  Lee  (1993) in Barro and  Lee  (1994). Countries  are 
rated on a score of 1 to 5 according to the maximum  of tariff rate and 
nontariff-barrier coverage  ratio: higher than 20%: "very high" (a rat- 
ing  of 5); between  15 and  20%: "high" (4); between  10% and  15%: 
"moderate" (3); between  5% and 10%: "low" (2); and between  0 and 
5%: "very low" (1). 
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46.  Contributions  to  variance  around  EC mean,  from  Summers  and 
Heston  (1994). 
47.  GDP  per  capita  (Figure  3):  Maddison  (1982).  Source:  Ben-David 
(1993). 
48.  GDP per capita (Figure 4, Table 7): Maddison  (1995). Trade  Policy and Economic  Growth ?  321 
49.  GDP  per  capita  (Figures  5-7):  Summers  and  Heston  (1994). 
50.  Ratio  of  import  duties  to  imports,  United  States,  from  Bureau  of  the 
Census  (1989,  Series  U211). 
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Comment 
CHANG-TAI  HSIEH 
Princeton  University 
Francisco Rodriguez  and Dani  Rodrik argue that the conventional  wis- 
dom  among  multilateral  institutions  in Washington  (and  many  econo- 
mists)  that lower  trade barriers results  in significantly  faster growth  is 
based on weak empirical evidence.  Their main point is that the empirical 
evidence  that purportedly  shows  a negative  correlation between  trade 
barriers and growth typically relies on measures  that are either measures 
of macroeconomic  imbalances  or bad  institutions,  and  are not  actually 
measures  of trade barriers. For example,  they  argue that a widely  used 
measure  of trade restrictions-deviation  of domestic  prices of tradables 
from world  prices-reflects  deviations  from PPP due  to overvalued  ex- 
change  rates,  and  is  not  a measure  of  trade barriers.  To take  another 
example,  Rodriguez  and  Rodrik  argue  that  the  widely  used  Sachs- 
Warner openness  index  is  largely  a  dummy  variable  for sub-Saharan 
Africa and countries with large macroeconomic  imbalances,  which  again 
is not a measure  of trade barriers. 
However,  the fact that trade barriers are not robustly  correlated with 
growth  once  controls  for macroeconomic  imbalances  and  bad  institu- 
tions  are  introduced  does  not  imply  that  trade  barriers  do  not  have 
deleterious  effects of growth.  There is a fundamental  identification  prob- 
lem  in  separating  the  effects  of trade restrictions  from those  of macro- 
economic  imbalances  and  bad  institutions,  since  countries  with  bad 
macroeconomic  policies  and  weak  institutions  also  have  severe  trade 
restrictions.  And  when  countries  liberalize  their trade regimes,  it typi- 
cally  takes  place  along  with  a  macroeconomic  stabilization  program. 
Therefore,  there  may  not  be  enough  cross-country  variation  in  trade 
restrictions  orthogonal  to macroeconomic  imbalances  to identify  the ef- 
fect  of  trade  on  growth,  even  if trade  restrictions  do  have  significant 
negative  effects  on  growth.  For example,  even  if the Sachs-Warner  in- 
dex is a dummy  for sub-Saharan Africa, it is still the case that most sub- 
Saharan countries  have  in fact imposed  significant  trade restrictions. 
Nonetheless,  I find  their main  point-that  there  is  a large  standard 
error around  precisely  how  much  trade  barriers matter  for  growth- 
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largely convincing.  But we shouldn't  find the results surprising.  Starting 
from Levine and Renelt (1992), there is overwhelming  evidence  that very 
little-not  even  factors such  as increases  in human  capital that a priori 
would  seem  to  be  important  in  explaining  growth-is  robust  in  the 
empirical growth  literature. Therefore, there is no reason to expect  mea- 
sures of trade barriers to be robustly  correlated with  growth,  even  if we 
were  to  obtain  accurate  measures  of  trade  restrictions.  Furthermore, 
given the diversity  of countries around the world and the different forms 
which  trade barriers take, it is silly to think that one can find a consistent 
cross-country  relationship  between  trade restrictions  and  growth.  First 
of all, trade barriers take many different forms. We do not expect there to 
be  significant  deleterious  growth  effects  from a well-administered  uni- 
form 20-30% tariff. In contrast, a country  in which  trade barriers are set 
in a discretionary  manner with  rampant rent seeking  will probably have 
poor  growth  performance.  Second  of  all,  countries  are very  different. 
Small countries  probably  benefit  more  from trade than large countries. 
Countries  that are more specialized  benefit  more from trade than coun- 
tries that are already well  diversified.  Finally, we  know  that trade barri- 
ers introduce distortions,  but so does every form of government  interven- 
tion,  and there is no reason to believe  that the costs of trade distortions 
are significantly  different  from the costs  of other  government  interven- 
tions.  So there  is a sense  in which  the empirical studies  that attempt  to 
find  a robust  cross-country  correlation  between  trade  restrictions  and 
growth  are as sensible  as a cross-country  regression  of growth  on,  say, 
sales taxes or income  taxes. 
One  way  to make  progress  in understanding  how  trade  restrictions 
affect growth  is to differentiate  between  the effects  of different  types  of 
trade barriers. Here,  the empirical growth  literature gives  us some  guid- 
ance on what to look for. Specifically, starting from De Long and Summers 
(1991), many authors have found that investment  in machinery and equip- 
ment  is the only  variable (other than a dummy  for sub-Saharan  Africa) 
that is robustly  correlated with  growth.  This is sensible.  After all, coun- 
tries that have  grown  rapidly  are ones  that have  invested  resources  in 
using the machines  that embody  the technologies  of the industrial revolu- 
tion. Trade policy-specifically,  restrictions on imports of capital goods- 
can affect machinery and equipment  investment  by increasing the price of 
imported  machinery  and  equipment.  Restrictions  on  capital-good  im- 
ports are even more harmful in a developing  country that has little domes- 
tic production  of  capital  goods  and  would  thus  benefit  the  most  from 
purchasing  capital  goods  embodying  the  most  advanced  technologies. 
As  far as I am  aware,  there  is no  study  that  specifically  studies  the 
growth effects of restrictions on capital-good  imports. There is, however, Comment 327 
suggestive  evidence  that  such  restrictions  have  important  effects.  It is 
well  known,  for example,  that Taiwan and Korea have  had highly  dis- 
torted trade regimes,  but which  nonetheless  always  kept domestic  prices 
of capital  goods  close  to world  prices.  Consequently,  despite  their dis- 
torted trade regimes,  the share of imports  and investment  in machinery 
and  investment  in these  two  countries  were  among  the  highest  in the 
world.  Another  piece  of evidence  is from Charles Jones's (1994) intrigu- 
ing paper-the  dual of De Long and Summers's  paper-that  shows  that 
the  relative  price  of  capital  differs  enormously  between  rich and  poor 
countries  (by a factor of four). Further, this relative price is significantly 
correlated  with  growth  even  after controlling  for initial  income,  so  we 
know  the correlation is not driven by reverse causation due to a Balassa- 
Samuelson  effect.  Clearly, the way  in which  the relative price of capital 
affects  growth  is  by  lowering  the  amount  of  capital  equipment;  if  a 
country increases the relative price of capital and thus of growth,  there is 
going  to be less of both. 
The main  problem  is that we  do  not  know  whether  the  large differ- 
ences  in relative price of capital (orthogonal  to GDP/worker)  are due  to 
differences  between  trade barriers for capital goods  and barriers for con- 
sumption  goods,  or due  to domestic  distortions  that affect the  relative 
price of all capital goods.  Clearly, if capital goods  are mostly imports,  the 
distinction  is moot.  However,  a simple  way to test this is to see whether 
the  share  of  imports  in  total  machinery  and  equipment  investment  is 
correlated with the relative price of capital. The idea is that if differences 
in the  relative  price  of capital  are due  entirely  to domestic  distortions, 
then  they should  affect the aggregate  quantity of investment  in machin- 
ery and equipment  but should  have no effect on the composition  of invest- 
ment between  imports and domestically  produced  capital goods.  Table 1 
shows  that, controlling for initial income and the manufacturing  share of 
GDP, a doubling  in  the  relative  price  of  capital  (about  the  difference 
between  Korea  and  India)  lowers  the  import  share  of  investment  by 
almost 6 percentage  points  in the full sample.  The effect is even  stronger 
in developing  countries,  where  a similar increase in the relative price of 
capital lowers  the import share by almost 10 percentage  points.1 It would 
obviously  be better to get  direct measures  of restrictions  on  imports  of 
capital  goods.  In  addition,  the  sample,  particularly  that  for  the  non- 
OECD countries,  is small,  since  we  are restricted  to the  countries  that 
1. The data on initial income  and manufacturing  share are from the Penn World  Tables  (Mark 
5.6).  The  relative  price  of  capital  is  from  Charles  Jones's  Web  site  (http://www. 
stanford.edu/-chadj/RelPrice.asc),  and imports of machinery and equipment  relative to 
total  investment  in machinery  and  equipment  were  graciously  provided  by Lee Jong- 
Wha (who  compiled  them  from the OECD's trade-statistics  datatapes). 328 *  HSIEH 
Table  1  CROSS-COUNTRY  DIFFERENCES  IN 
RELATIVE  PRICE  OF CAPITAL  AFFECT 
IMPORTS  OF CAPITAL  GOODS 
Full  Non-OECD 
Variable  sample  countries 
log(relative  -0.0574  -0.0986 
price of capital)  (0.0359)  (0.0453) 
Manufacturing  0.3881  0.7954 
share of GDP  (0.2639)  (0.3049) 
log(initial  -0.1040  -0.0738 
income per capita)  (0.1085)  (0.1685) 
N  52  35 
SEE  0.1498  0.1490 
R2  0.12  0.26 
Dependent variable  is imports of capital  goods from OECD  countries/ 
total investment  in machinery  and equipment. 
have participated  in the benchmark  surveys  of the United Nations  Inter- 
national  Comparisons  Project.  Nonetheless,  these  results  provide  sug- 
gestive  evidence  that part of the cross-country  difference  in the relative 
price of capital is due to trade barriers. 
One  can  also  turn  to  narrative  histories  of  particular  countries  for 
evidence  of the impact of capital-good  restrictions.  For example,  I have 
always  found  Carlos  Diaz-Alejandro's  (1970) story  of Argentina's  eco- 
nomic  decline  particularly  compelling  and disturbing.  Starting with  the 
Great Depression,  Argentina  sought  to  redistribute  wealth  from  rural 
landowners  and exporting  elites  to the  urban working  class by making 
imports  of consumer  goods  freely  available but  severely  restricting im- 
ports of capital goods.  This policy  of redistribution  doubled  the relative 
price  of  capital  in Argentina  from  the  late  1930s to the  late  1940s (see 
Figure  1),  which  led  to  anemic  rates  of  investment  in  machinery  and 
equipment  in Argentina  since the end  of World War II. Consequently,  a 
country  that was  among  the wealthiest  nations  in the world  in the early 
twentieth  century is now  decidedly  a Third World nation. 
In the  other  direction,  the  experience  of India in the  1990s provides 
evidence  that  the  removal  of  restrictions  on  capital-good  imports  can 
have  significant  positive  effects on growth.  Specifically, India liberalized 
imports  of capital goods  in the early 1990s without  lowering  barriers on 
imports of consumer  goods  (which it has done only recently).  Due to the Comment 329 
Figure 1 CHANGE  IN RELATIVE  PRICE  OF MACHINERY  AND EQUIPMENT: 
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removal  of  trade barriers on  capital  goods,  there  has  been  a surge  of 
capital-good  imports in India over the last decade.  Although  it is difficult 
to disentangle  the effect  of this policy  change  from that of other policy 
reforms introduced  by the Indian Government  at the same time, the fact 
is that India has experienced  high  growth  rates over the last decade. 
Ultimately  then,  this  paper  should  not  change  one's  prior idea  that 
trade restrictions  are bad  for growth,  but  it is useful  to point  out  that 
there  is  a  large  standard  error surrounding  the  point  estimate  of  its 
negative  effect.  If we  want  to narrow this error band,  it is important  to 
differentiate  between  the  very  different  types  of trade restrictions  that 
countries  have  put  into place.  For example,  I have  provided  some  sug- 
gestive  evidence  that restrictions  on  capital-good  imports  have  impor- 
tant adverse  effects  on growth.  To the extent that this paper prompts  us 
to ask (and attempt to answer)  more refined questions  about how  trade 
restrictions  affect  growth,  it  serves  a  useful  purpose.  Nonetheless,  I 
worry  about  the  potential  misuse  of  the  authors'  fine  work  by  oppo- 
nents  of free trade in the political arena. After all, there are many vested 
interests  that  benefit  from  trade  restrictions  and  much  fewer  interest 
groups  that actively  support  free  trade.  It would  be  a shame  if oppo- 
nents  of free trade (wrongly)  interpret this paper as claiming  that trade 
restrictions  do not  have  adverse  effects  on  growth,  rather than as say- 
ing we  don't precisely  know  how  much trade barriers affect growth. 330 *  JONES 
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1. Introduction 
Rodriguez  and  Rodrik replicate  and  check for robustness  the results  of 
several  of the most influential  papers in the cross-country  growth  litera- 
ture on  trade policy  and  economic  growth.  These  studies  suggest  that 
policies  that distort trade are associated  with  reduced  growth  rates over 
some  period  of time,  and that the effects  are fairly important  in magni- 
tude  and relatively  robust in terms of statistical significance. 
Interpreted  narrowly,  the  findings  of Rodriguez  and  Rodrik suggest 
that the results  of these  existing  studies  are not  as strong  as the papers 
indicate.  First, Rodriguez  and Rodrik remind us that theory provides  no 
clear indication  of the net  effect: trade restrictions  could  reduce  income 
levels  or growth  rates through  the usual channels  such as specialization, 
but  the  common  infant-industry  argument,  for example,  suggests  that 
trade restrictions could in some  circumstances  promote  long-run  perfor- 
mance.  Second,  we  do not know  exactly how  we  should  measure  trade 
restrictions,  which  leads  to  a large  number  of  different  approaches  in 
the literature. However,  it is not obvious  that the variables used  in these 
studies  truly  capture policy  restrictions  on  trade,  making  the  evidence 
difficult to interpret. Finally, Rodriguez  and Rodrik argue that the results 
of these studies  are not particularly robust. Including additional variables 
that  plausibly  belong  in  the  specification,  especially  some  measure  of 
macroeconomic  distortions  (such as the black-market premium)  or some 
measure  of institutional  quality  or property  rights  [such  as the  Knack- 
Keefer (1995) measure],  typically reduces the magnitude  of the effect and 
enlarges the confidence  interval substantially so that the trade-policy vari- 
able is not statistically  significant  at traditional levels. 
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that the results  of these  existing  studies  are not  as strong  as the papers 
indicate.  First, Rodriguez  and Rodrik remind us that theory provides  no 
clear indication  of the net  effect: trade restrictions  could  reduce  income 
levels  or growth  rates through  the usual channels  such as specialization, 
but  the  common  infant-industry  argument,  for example,  suggests  that 
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the literature. However,  it is not obvious  that the variables used  in these 
studies  truly  capture policy  restrictions  on  trade,  making  the  evidence 
difficult to interpret. Finally, Rodriguez  and Rodrik argue that the results 
of these studies  are not particularly robust. Including additional variables 
that  plausibly  belong  in  the  specification,  especially  some  measure  of 
macroeconomic  distortions  (such as the black-market premium)  or some 
measure  of institutional  quality  or property  rights  [such  as the  Knack- 
Keefer (1995) measure],  typically reduces the magnitude  of the effect and 
enlarges the confidence  interval substantially so that the trade-policy vari- 
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Interpreted  broadly,  the paper  seems  to suggest  that trade-policy  re- 
strictions  may not be particularly harmful to long-run  economic  perfor- 
mance,  and that other factors could be much more important. 
In preparing my discussion,  I contacted  several of the authors of four of 
the papers  discussed  by Rodriguez  and Rodrik to get their general reac- 
tions.  Because the issues  are complicated  and it would  constitute  a paper 
in itself, I have decided  not to report and discuss  their comments  point by 
point. Suffice it to say that there are disagreements  about a number of the 
criticisms among the parties involved.1  Related to the "broad" interpreta- 
tion of the paper, these authors reminded  me that the belief among some 
economists  that trade restrictions are harmful in the long run is based on 
many kinds of evidence,  including  case studies  and micro studies.  How- 
ever,  because  this broader  discussion  is not  my  area of  expertise,  and 
because  surely cross-country  regressions  are one piece of evidence  upon 
which these beliefs are based,  I will limit the scope of my discussion  in the 
way the paper is limited. 
My comment  on Rodriguez  and Rodrik's paper will focus on the mag- 
nitude  of the effect of trade restrictions  on economic  performance,  pro- 
viding  a slightly  different  emphasis  from  that presented  in the  paper. 
First,  I would  like  to  review  a useful  way  that  cross-country  growth 
regressions  can be interpreted,  focusing  especially  on the magnitude  of 
the estimated  effects in the long  run. Second,  I will attempt to interpret 
in this framework  some  specifications  that Rodriguez  and Rodrik seem 
to approve  of most.  In particular, I'd like to look at two questions:  "What 
is our best  estimate  of the  effect  of trade restrictions  on long-term  eco- 
1. I will report  my interpretation  of a few of the most interesting  ones, though I surely will 
not do the authors justice. Andrew Warer pointed out to me that the "monopolizes 
exports"  component  of the Sachs-Warer index is not  a dummy for  sub-Saharan  Africa.  It 
is based on a careful  analysis  of the subject  by the World  Bank.  It  may closely resemble  an 
Africa  dummy,  but maybe  that is a good thing!  One could include  an Africa  dummy  with 
the Sachs-Warer openness measure to check for robustness;  in my tests, the openness 
measure survives. Also, the spirit of their index is that a country  can close itself off in a 
number  of different  ways that may differ across  countries,  and Sachs and Warner  try to 
provide an index to capture  this phenomenon. This nonlinearity  means that running a 
horse race  among  the components  of the index  will not capture  the same forces.  Dan Ben- 
David  reminded  me of Figures  XII  and XIII  in his paper,  which provide  an additional  piece 
of evidence supporting  his view: the reduction  in tariffs  between the United States and 
Canada  in the late 1960s  associated  with the Kennedy  round, and the associated  behavior 
of incomes. He also noted that  the breakdown  of European  trade  in the interwar  period  is 
associated  with a cessation of convergence,  and the resumption  of convergence  occurs 
with the reduction  of tariffs  and quotas  after  the war.  Sebastian  Edwards  noted that  he has 
tried  in earlier  work  to address  measurement-error  concerns  by running  "reverse"  regres- 
sions. With respect to heteroskedasticity,  he also commented that there are conceptual 
concerns  about White-robust  errors  and that different  weightings give different  results 
(for  example,  weighting by exports  per capita  gives results  like those he obtained).  David 
Dollar provided a broader  perspective that is incorporated  throughout my comment. 332 *  JONES 
nomic  performance?" and "How confident  are we  about the magnitude 
of this effect?" 
2. Interpreting  Cross-Country  Growth  Regressions 
The interpretation  of cross-country  growth  regressions  that I find most 
useful  is provided  by  Mankiw,  Romer, and  Weil (1992) and  Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1992). These  papers  derive  a basic  cross-country  growth 
specification  from  a neoclassical  growth  model.  The  derived  specifica- 
tion suggests  that the growth  rate of a particular country over some  time 
period,  like  thirty years,  is a function  (often  linearized)  of the  gap be- 
tween  where  the country starts out and the country's  steady  state.  To be 
more  accurate,  the  simplest  neoclassical  growth  model  has  one  state 
variable, such as the ratio of per capita income to the technology  index (9 
y/A), and the model  predicts  that the growth  rate of this state variable 
is approximately  proportional  to the gap between  its current value  and 
its steady-state  value: 
t  A(log  it 
- 
log  y), 
pit 
where  A is commonly  called  the speed  of convergence.  The technology 
index  is often assumed  to follow  some  simple  process,  such as 
log  Ait =  log  Ai  +  log  Zt +  Eit. 
That is, we  assume  that a country's  technology  index is the product  of a 
parameter Ai indexing  a country's long-run productivity  level,  the world 
technology  index  (which is assumed  to grow at a constant rate g), and an 
idiosyncratic  disturbance  around this trend. 
The first equation  can be integrated  and combined  with  the second  to 
yield  a cross-country  growth  specification: 
1 
gi  =  constant  -  13  log  yio +  3 log  (y*Ai) +  13ei + T (eit -  io0)  (1) 
where  giT  (1/T)(log  YiT  -  log  Yio)  and  p-  (1/T)(1  -  e-r). 
A difficulty  with  this  approach  is that one  does  not  observe  directly 
the  steady  state to which  countries  are converging,  nor the  total factor 
productivity  parameter. Variables such as investment  rates in physical  or 
human  capital can be connected  to y* theoretically,  but of course  these Comment  *  333 
variables  are typically  endogenous  as  well.  This  leads  to  the  difficult 
situation  in which  the econometrician  does  not know  the correct specifi- 
cation but has a large number of candidate  regressors  at hand.  An addi- 
tional problem with this approach is the possible  correlation of the candi- 
date  regressors  with  the  error  term(s),  including  the  possibility  of 
omitted-variable  bias and endogeneity. 
What I'd like to point  out about this specification,  however,  is that the 
reason variables like trade policy or the quality of institutions  are thought 
to enter these  regressions  is that they  are potential  determinants  of the 
steady-state  income  level  (detrended  by the world  technology  index) to- 
ward which an economy  is converging.  This suggests  an alternative speci- 
fication  of the regression  that Mankiw,  Romer, and Weil (1992) explore 
and that Hall and Jones (1999) have emphasized  recently, a specification in 
levels  rather than growth  rates: 
1 
log  yit =  constant  +  log(y*Ai)  +  Eit  -  -  gi  (2) 
If levels  of output  per worker at time t are randomly  distributed  around 
their  steady-state  values,  then  this  specification  has  the  potential  to 
work well.  Notice  that it uses  different variation  in the data, in that the 
estimation  does  not  first  condition  on  an  earlier  level  of  output  per 
worker.  One  advantage  is that more precise  estimates  may be obtained 
as a result.  Of course,  there  are still endogeneity  and  omitted-variable 
problems,  but these issues  are also relevant for the specification  in terms 
of growth  rates; in some  ways,  they  are simply  made  more explicit by 
the levels  specification. 
In  terms  of  interpretation,  the  coefficients  from  the  cross-country 
growth  specification  are really  the  product  of  two  factors: a speed-of- 
convergence  factor (13)  and the coefficient that relates the particular vari- 
able to the steady-state  level of income.  One can interpret this product of 
coefficients  as the effect on average growth rates over a particular period, 
but when  the length  of the time period  is changing,  as it is across these 
studies,  the size of the coefficient will change  for this reason (note that  3 
depends  on T), making comparisons  across specifications  difficult. 
An  alternative  useful  interpretation  is  obtained  by  calculating  the 
long-run  effect on the steady  state,  either by dividing  by the coefficient 
on  initial  income  or simply  by  running  the  levels  regression  directly.2 
One  may  of course  also care about the rate at which  the economy  con- 
2. These two methods  will generally  yield  different results,  since different variation in the 
data is used  to estimate  the effects; both are useful  in practice. 334 *  JONES 
verges  to its  steady  state,  and  this  rate,  A, can be  calculated  from  the 
estimate  of j3. 
3. A Closer  Look  at Some  Results 
Rodriguez and Rodrik examine a large number of measures of trade restric- 
tions in their evaluation  of the literature. Many are criticized for reasons 
discussed  briefly  above,  but a few  are put  forward  as being  reasonable 
measures.  These  are typically  the most  direct measures  of tariff rates or 
nontariff  barriers. I will  focus  on  three particular measures:  (1) the QT 
component  of the Sachs-Warner  openness  measure,  which  takes a value 
of  1  unless  the  country  had  average  tariff rates  higher  than  40% or 
nontariff barriers covered more than 40% of imports, in which case it takes 
a value  of 0; (2) an average tariff rate measure  from Barro and Lee (1993) 
(owti);  and  (3) the  simple  average  of the  available  statistics  on  import 
duties  as a percentage  of imports,  which  are reported in Table VIII of the 
conference  version  of their paper and which  Rodriguez  and Rodrik refer 
to in their conclusion.  For some  reason that I do not understand,  they do 
not use this import-duties  variable in any of their robustness  checks in the 
paper. 
I should  make clear from the beginning  that a narrow version  of Rodri- 
guez  and  Rodrik's  conclusion  survives  my  analysis  of these  data: esti- 
mates  using  these  variables are not completely  robust,  in the sense  that 
confidence  intervals are large in some  specifications.  However,  I'd like to 
go further and examine  the magnitude  of the effects and the confidence 
interval itself. What is our best guess  about the effect of trade restrictions 
on long-run economic  performance,  and what is our range of uncertainty? 
Table 1 summarizes  my  findings  from  estimating  approximately  100 
specifications;  from among  these,  I've selected  the  13 that strike me  as 
most  appropriate,  and  I've  further summarized  these  13 specifications 
by averaging  the coefficients  and p-values  and reporting  some  statistics. 
A few  of the specifications  are growth  regressions,  replicating  results in 
Rodriguez  and Rodrik's paper; most  are levels  regressions  of the  same 
basic specifications,  which  generally  improved  the precision  of the esti- 
mates.3  One  possible  problem  with  these  levels  regressions  is  reverse 
causality: poor countries  may resort to tariffs to raise revenue  more than 
rich countries,  e.g.,  because  their tax systems  are not well developed.  In 
results  not  reported,  I made  some  attempt  to  address  issues  of  endo- 
geneity  by  instrumenting  with  the  variables  used  in  Hall  and  Jones 
3. The growth-regression  specifications  produced  estimates  of the long-run  effect of 0.535 
for QT and  -1.80  for owti,  roughly  in line with  the results  from the levels  regressions. Comment  335 
Table 1  SOME ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
Sachs-Warner  Tariff  Avg. import 
QT  rate, owti  duties 
Results  for All Specifications  but Worst 
Average  long-run  effect  0.485  -1.714  -2.758 
S.d.  of variable  {0,1}  0.17  0.079 
Average  p-value  0.064  0.055  0.005 
Number  of specifications  4  4  2 
Fraction with p <  .10  3/4  3/4  2/2 
Resultsfrom Worst Specification 
Long-run effect  0.158  -0.411  -0.447 
p-value  0.275  0.509  0.375 
95% conf.  interval  (-0.13,  0.45)  (-1.6,  0.83)  (-3.17,  2.27) 
Proportional  Reduction  of SS Output per Workerfrom  a Large  Increase  in 
Trade  Restrictions 
All but "worst"  39%  69%  58% 
"Worst"  15%  24%  13% 
The worst specification  for the Sachs-Warner  QT variable  occurs when Knack  and Keefer's  (1995) 
quality-of-institutions  variable  (icrge)  is added to the specification.  The worst specification  for the tariff 
rate  (owti) occurs  when both icrge  is added and simultaneously  the outlier  India  is dropped.  The  worst 
specification  for the average-import-duties  variable  occurs  when an indicator  variable  for the African 
continent  is added to the specification.  The calculations  of long-run  effects report  the proportionality 
factor  by which incomes would be reduced in the long run if a hypothetical  country  increased  trade 
restrictions  by 4 standard  deviations  (or went from  a 1 to a 0 in the Sachs-Warer case). It is calculated 
as, e.g.,  1 -  exp (,/ x 4 x stdev). All but two of the regression  results are from levels regressions;  a 
growth regression  is run for each of these first  two variables  (and is the specification  with the largest  p- 
value in the first  part  of the table).  The first  two columns  use the Rodriguez-Rodrik  dataset  Sw.dat and 
include gvxdxe, assassp, revcoup, and be as additional  regressors,  sometimes  adding africa  and icrge. 
Results  for the last column  include  variables  from  Hall and Jones  (1999)  as additional  regressors. 
(1999); in  general,  the  point  estimates  were  actually  a  little  larger  in 
magnitude,  perhaps  because  of  measurement  error, but  the  estimates 
were less precise.  A similar result is found by Frankel and Romer (1999). 
The table is divided  into three parts.  In the first, I report the average 
effect  on  steady-state  incomes  from  two  to  four  specifications  that ex- 
clude  the  specification  that  is  worst in  the  sense  of  having  the  least- 
significant  (and,  it turns out,  smallest)  estimate.  In the second,  I report 
this worst  specification. 
In general, there are a number of reasonable  specifications  that lead to 
precisely  estimated  effects,  as summarized  in the first part of the table. In 
my brief experience,  however,  there were typically one or two key things 
that could be added  to these  specifications  that led to problems  (see the 
notes  to the table).  For example,  adding  the quality-of-institutions  vari- 
able from Knack and Keefer (1995) often led the trade-policy variable to be 
estimated imprecisely. This could mean that the trade-policy variable is in 336 - JONES 
part proxying  for other  kinds  of  distortions  that  are omitted  from  the 
specification.  On the other hand,  the Knack-Keefer  variable is itself not 
without  problems,  as it is a subjective  measure  constructed  by a consult- 
ing firm. 
The  third section  of the  table examines  the  magnitude  of the  effects 
estimated  in the previous  two parts. Specifically, I calculate the change in 
steady-state  income  associated  with  a large change  in trade policy, viz.  a 
movement  of 4 standard  deviations,  or a movement  from 1 to 0 for the 
Sachs-Warner  variable.  For all but  the  worst  specifications,  our  best 
estimate  of the  size  of the effect  is substantial-a  decline  in income  by 
40% to 70%. For the worst  specification,  the effects  are smaller: income 
declines  by between  13% and 24% in the long run. 
Overall,  these  numbers  are similar to results  calculated  from some  of 
the specifications  reported by Rodriguez  and Rodrik, such as in Table 3. 
However,  at least  in the  conference  version  of their paper,  they  do not 
provide  enough  detail for the reader to make these  calculations. 
4.  Final  Thoughts 
There are two  other recent papers  that I think should  be mentioned  in 
this context.  The first is an omission  from the conference  version  of the 
paper  that has to some  extent been  addressed  in the published  version: 
the study  of openness  and income  levels  by Frankel and Romer (1999). 
Frankel  and  Romer's  measure  of  openness  is  the  trade  share  of  GDP 
rather  than  a policy  variable,  and  their  general  finding  is  a relatively 
robust relationship  between  openness  and income  levels:  a change  that 
increases  the trade share by one percentage  point raises income levels  by 
1% to 2%. A key contribution  of the paper is to show  that this finding  is 
robust to endogeneity  concerns by using  the geographical  determinants 
of trade as an instrument.  Another  finding,  however,  is that the magni- 
tude  of  the  effect  is  somewhat  imprecisely  estimated,  and  95% confi- 
dence  intervals  include  zero in a number  of specifications. 
Another  paper  that I've found  helpful  is Sala-i-Martin (1997). People 
sometimes  conclude  from the cross-country  growth  regression  literature 
that  virtually  none  of  the  relationships  are  robust,  a  statement  that 
would  seem  to  receive  support  from  Rodriguez  and  Rodrik.  Sala-i- 
Martin builds  on  the  robustness  work  by  Levine  and  Renelt  (1992) by 
examining  the  entire  distribution  of  coefficient  estimates  on  particular 
variables from running more than 32,000 permutations  of growth  regres- 
sions.  As a general matter, Sala-i-Martin highlights  a number of variables 
that are robust across specifications,  including  the Sachs-Warner  open- 
ness  measure.  On the other hand,  consistent  with  the present  paper- 
and with  the original results  of Levine and Renelt (1992)-Sala-i-Martin Discussion 337 
finds that the other measures  of trade policy  he examines  are among the 
least  robust  variables  in  his  study,  being  statistically  significant  at the 
95% level  less  than  4% of the  time.  He  does  find  that the  coefficients 
have  the  "right" sign  in 60% to 80% of the  specifications  he  considers, 
depending  on the measure. 
In conclusion,  it seems  to me that the cross-country  growth regression 
evidence  leads  to the  following  results.  Our best  estimate  is that trade 
restrictions  are harmful  to  long-run  incomes,  and  that  the  effects  are 
potentially  large.  For this  reason,  I worry  a  little  about  the  "broad" 
interpretation  of  the  paper  that  I provided  at the  beginning  of my  re- 
marks.  In  addition,  however,  there  is  a  large  amount  of  uncertainty 
regarding  the  magnitude  of the  effect; it could  be  small,  and  there  are 
some  specifications  that allow  for the possibility  that the effect works in 
the opposite  direction.  Cross-country  growth  regressions  appear to be a 
coarse tool for this particular question,  and,  at least so far, are unable to 
provide  a more precise answer. 
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sample.  With  respect  to his  own  work  with  Jeff Sachs,  Warner argued 
that  there  are  many  ways  to  close  an  economy  to  trade-hence  the 
strategy  of constructing  a composite  variable which  treats a country  as 
being  closed  to trade if any of a number  of criteria are met.  Dani Rodrik 
said that it is difficult to interpret the bivariate relationship  of tariff rates 
and  growth,  as rich countries  tend  to lower  tariff rates,  which  leads  to 
the possibility  of reverse  causality; he also questioned  whether  the esti- 
mated  relationship  between  tariff rates  and  growth  holds  up  in  more 
recent  data. Rodrik agreed  in general  with  Sachs and Warner's strategy 
of combining  indicators.  However,  given  the paper's  finding  that much 
of  the  statistical  effect  of  the  Sachs-Warner  indicator  is  due  to  only 
two of the variables that make it up,  he argued that one must be careful 
to determine  whether  these  key variables truly measure trade policies  or 
instead  reflect other country  characteristics. 
Alberto  Alesina  argued  that growth  rates may  be  an especially  poor 
measure  of the benefits  of trade; for example,  trade permits  people  to 
enjoy  a wide  variety  of products  not  produced  at home.  On  the  other 
hand,  Alesina  and  Allan  Drazen  both  emphasized  the point  that trade 
policy is not made by social planners  but by lobbies  and interest groups. 
It may be that interest groups  fight harder to protect their income  shares 
through  trade protection  when  income  is growing  slowly  overall; this is 
yet another possible  source  of reverse  causation.  Pursuing  the political- 
economy  issue,  Daron  Acemoglu  pointed  out  that  the  correlation  be- 
tween  restrictive  trade policies  and  corrupt,  rent-seeking  governments 
may not be an accident; the two may be mutually  supporting.  Thus,  one 
benefit of more open trade is that it may reduce the scope for governmen- 
tal corruption. 
Marvin  Goodfriend  differentiated  between  the  classical  static  effi- 
ciency benefits  of trade and the dynamic  gains associated  with the diffu- 
sion  of  knowledge  and  technology.  Possibly,  he  suggested,  improving 
communications  (including  developments  such  as the Internet) will  re- 
duce the importance  of trade policy  for information  flows. 
Greg Mankiw was not surprised by the lack of robustness  in the cross- 
country results,  given  the large number of candidate variables relative to 
the  number  of  country  observations.  He  conjectured  that  economists 
support  free trade because  they believe  Ricardo, not because  they have 
been  convinced  by  regressions.  Rodrik  agreed  that  there  is  a  strong 
presumption  that  trade  restrictions  are  distortionary,  but  that  magni- 
tudes  are important.  For example,  if the growth effects of trade liberaliza- 
tion  are  small,  economic  advisors  may  do  better  by  giving  a  higher 
priority to other types  of reforms. 